Legal representation and a Bill of Rights by Lawrenson, Natalie Carina
/i 
LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND A BILL OF RIGHTS 
NATALIE CARINA LAWRENSON 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment of part of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Laws in approved courses and a minor dissertation. 
The other part of the requirement for this. degree was the completion of a programme of 
courses. 
Cape Town 1993. 
,_. __ "1:..::'/!'<~.~.:,,.,_,?·., •• ~,; .,. . ., ·e-;,.••,,. r ,, i,,,_.,_:.,._,';.,~~, -~''.-~~":'~,:.,."i~~"-=,, 
~ The Unh: 1..:..1 ~~ih, ,_f ( ,. · ·• r:~.1.·-r-, h ,,.. ; .. ,.,.~ ..... " ;:~~:~n 2 
I ·tho riqht· tn /~(:;"',~ Hh·i•r: ~I; .. : :': -.~ ... ~;. in •,,-1110!" r 











The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 










To Lisa, Kiri and John 
.ii 
DECLARATION 
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree 
of Master of Laws in the Department of Law, University of Cape Town. It has not been 
submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university. 
Natalie Lawrenson 
30 April 1993 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor N.C. Steytler, for guiding the dissertation to 
completion and for his helpfulness at all times. 
I also wish to thank Proffesor I. Leeman for acting as co-supervisor to this dissertation. 
A special word of thanks to the librarians at the Brand Van Zyl Law Library for their 
friendly assistance at all times. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER TWO CURRENT POSITION OF THE RIGHT TO LEGAL 




Statutory and Case Law 
CHAPTER THREE - APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING 
BILLS OF RIGHTS 
1. Restrictive Interpretation 
2. Purposive Interpretation 
2.1 Case law of the United States of America 
2.2 Case law of Canada 
2.3 . Case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Commission on Human Rights 
CHAPTER FOUR - INTERPRETING A LIMITED RIGHT 
TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
1. Restrictive Interpretation 
2. Purposive Interpretation 
2:.1 American case law 















2.3 Case law in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights 
2.3.1 Principle of 'equality of arms' 
2.3.2 Right of 'access to court' 
3. Purposive interpretation of the Government Charter 
3.1 Equality before the law 
3.2 Fair Trial 
3.3 Circumscription clause 
CHAPTER FIVE INTERPRETING AN EXPANSIVE RIGHT 





CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION 





















,The right to legal representation has been acknowledged as a fundamental right of an accu~ed 
in a criminal trial. 1 Traditionally, however, this ,right has been viewed as a right t~ retain 
counsel, rather than a positive right to be provided with legal representation in the case of 
indigent accused. 2 
The importance of legal assistance for accused persons being tried in an adversarial justice -· 
system has been recognised in -~ther Anglo~Am~rican leg_al _systems. 3 In an adversarial 
system the duty of a presiding officer is to act as an independent and objective adjudicator 
of the facts and evidence presented to him or her by the two parties to the trial. The onus 
is on the litigants to advance their own case. 4 It natural! y follows that the strength of a 
1 S v Mabaso and Another 1990(3) SA 185(A), at 201F; S73 or' Act 51 of 1977; S v Nqula 1974 (1) 
SA 801 (E) at 804D; S v Wessels and Another 1966 (4) SA 89 (C) at 910-92 H; Brink v Commissioner of 
Police 1960 (3) SA 65 (T). 
2 Grant,E 'The Right to Counsel: recent developments in South Africa' SACJ (1989)2 at 48; S v 
Wessels 1966(4) SA 89(C); S v Blooms 1966(4) SA 417(C); S v Baloyi 1978(3) SA 290(T); S v Davids; S v 
Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 198C; S v Mthwa11a 1989 (4) SA 361 (N) at 366B-C. Early American and 
English practice reflected a similar approach - see Beaney,WM 'The Right to Counsel' In: The Rights of the 
Accused in Law and Action (1972) SS Nagel (ed) at 148. 
3 Ameri~an case law: Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963); Argersinger v Hamlin 407 US 25 
(197,2); United States v Wade 388 US 218 (1967). English case law: R v Elton [1942) 68 Cr App R 126; R v 
Serghiou [1966) 3 All ER 637. 
4 Steytler,NC (1988) The Undefended Accused at 4-10; 
party's case depends on the skill cf the litigator.5 
In Powell v Alabama6 the court recognised that 
[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law . . . He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 7 
It is submitted that the need of such a guiding hand for an illiterate accused is even greater. 8 
In a situation where one party is represented by a skilled lawyer and the other is not, the 
latter's chance of a successful defence could be severely prejudiced. This position is all the 
more critical where the unrepresented party is retarded by social, educational and economic 
inequalities. In the case of Mandela v Minister of Prisons,9 the right of access to a legal 
adviser was described as a corollary of the right to access to the courts. 
The positive right to be provided with legal representation has furthermore been recognised 
in the following international documents: (i) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
5 That is, in preparing and leading the necessary evidence, cross-exarninig witnesses and presenting 
a closing argument, if so requested. See also S v Wesselr and Another 1966 (4) SA 89 (C) at 97H-98A, where 
Van Zyl J says 'that 'the manner of a man's conviction is a fundamental part of the justice he receives. The way 
his case is presented may have a strong bearing upon the public's moral assessment of his offence', 
6 287 us 45 (1932). 
1 Ibid at 69. 
8 'In an adversarial system, the right of all persons faced with loss of liberty to have the assistance of 
counsel seems obvious' - Beaney op cit note 2 at 147. 
9 1983 (1) SA 938 (A) at 957. 
2 
Rights; 10 (ii) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms; 11 (iii) the American Convention on Human Rights; 12 (iv) the Body of Principles 
for the Protection of all Persons under any form of detention or imprisonment;13 and (v) the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 14 
The reasons behind the above developments have been based on the principles of 'equality' 
and 'fairness'. The basic principle underlying most democratic legal systems is that all 
persons shall receive equal protection of the law. By 'equal protection', it is meant that all 
accused persons, when faced with a criminal charge by the State, should be placed in an 
equal position. In other words, where an accused person wishes to be defended by a legal 
representative, but can not afford to pay for counsel, due to indigence, then such an accused 
must be provided with legal assitance in order to ensure equal protection for both rich and 
poor alike. 15 
The principle of 'fairness' entails that an accused person is placed on an equal footing vis-a-
vis the prosecutor. The layperson lacks the necessary skill and knowledge of the science and 
mechanisms of the law, in order to confront a legally trained prosecutor and to present a 
10 Article 14(3){d). 
11 Article 6(3)(c). 
12 Artide 8(2)(e). 
13 Principle 1·7. 
14 Article 40(2)(b)(ii). 
. . 
15 Steytler,NC 'Equality before the law: being practical about principle' (1992) SA/HR vol8(1) at 114; 
Douglas v California 372 US 353 (1963) at 358 - '[t]he indigent ... has only the right lo a meaningless ritual, 
whilst the rich man has a meaningful appeal'. 
3 
1 
possibly valid defence to the court. 16 
It is submitted in light of the above discussion, that if all persons are to receive equal 
protection of the law, the right to legal representation must include the right to be provided 
with legal representation where an accused is indigent and desires such assistance. 
In the following chapters I shall discuss the current position in South African law regarding 
the right to legal representation, as well as the the American, Canadian and European Court 
of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights jurisprudence on this 
issue; and shall, thereafter, look at future possibilities of this right in terms of the various 
proposed Charters and draft Bills of Rights that have been put forward for a future South 
African Bill of Rights. Two distinct strands · are evident from these various proposals 
regarding the right to legal representation. The first strand is that of the (present) 
Government's draft Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and of the South African Law 
, 
Commission's interim report of 1991.17 Both these proposals have followed the dictum as 
enunciated in S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana, 18 which extends the traditional. right 
-- - - - -- . -----
to legal representation to include a right to be informed of the entilements to legal_ 
representation and to apply for legal aid, but does not impose a duty on the State to provide 
indigent accused with State-funded legal assistance. 19 
16 Powell v Alabama 287 US 45 (1932) at 68-9. 
17 Project 58: Group and Human Rights, August 1991. 
18 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
19 Clauses 26 and Article 7, respectively. 
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The other strand is that of the AN<;_'s d!aft Bill of Rights, the Charter for Social Justice and 
the South African Law Commission Report on Group and Human Rights of 1989. The 
approach of these proposals is that the right to legal representation includes the right of 
indigent accused to be provided with legal representation 'where justice so requires'. 20 
The possible interpretations flowing from the adoption of either of these two approaches in 
a future South African Bill of Rights, will be investigated, with specific focus on a broader 
interpretation of the right to be provided with legal representation.21 
20 Article 2(21); article 12(3); and article 25(d) respectively. 
21 .This idea stems from a question posed by McQuoid-Mason,DJ in ' A Bill of Rights and Legal 




CURRENT POSITION OF IBE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN 
soum AFRICAN LA w 
In South African law the right to legal representation in criminal proceedings is derived from 
both common law1 and statutory legislation.2 
1. Common Law 
The earliest Roman litigation procedures were governed by the legis actio. 3 The most 
commonly used of the five leges actiones were the legis actio sacramento and the legis actio 
per manus iniectionem. 4 Neither of these actions appear to have been of great assistance to 
the indigent plebians. In terms of the former procedure, priestly lawyers interpreted the case 
without the partif:S to the action being represented or themselves present at the trial. 5 The 
1 Li Kui Yu v Superintendent of Labourers 1906 TS 181 at 187-8; Dabner v South African Railways 
& Harbours 1920 AD 583 at 586; Brink v Commissioner of Police 1960(3) SA 65 (T) at 67; S v WesseLr 
1966(4) SA 89 (C) at 95-7. 
2 McQuoid-Mason,DJ (1982) Legal Aid in South Africa at 5; Selikowitz,S 'Defence by counsel in 
criminal proceedings under South African law' Acta Juridica (1965/66) 53 at 77; Section 73 of Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
3 Cappelletti,M (1975) Toward equal justice: a comparative study of legal aid in modem societies 
at 6. 
4 Femandez,LD (1984)A comparison between the legal aid systems of South Africa and West Germany 
ill theory and in practice at 5-6. 
5 Cappelletti states that the case was brought before a magistrate by a series of ritual acts and 
declarations; op cit note 3 at 6. 
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proceedings were not conducted in public and the interpretatio of the secular law was kept 
a secret. In terms of both procedures there was also invariably a payment of money involved 
in the form of a 'deposit', which the indigent accused could not afford to pay themselves.6 
During the Classical Roman period litigation proceedings resembled modern-day practices. 
The hearings were open to the public and the litigants were represented by advocati or 
patroni, who were not lawyers but skilled orators.7 Indigent accused were afforded legal 
representation by· means of the clientela system. 8 This system was very successful during 
the Republic and early Empire, but did not survive the political struggles of the Post-classical 
period, which neglected the interests of the impecunious in favour of political justice. Legal 
aid was only assigned to minors, physically or mentally handicapped persons and to persons 
who, because of duress exercised by their adversary, were unable to obtain an advocate to 
represent them. 9 
In Roman-Dutch law the plight of the indigent accused received greater attention. Upon the 
request of an indigent accused, a taelman was appointed by the court. 10 A similar practice 
was adopted in South African law whereby several statutory and judicial provisions were 
6 Fernandez op cit note 4 at 5-6. 
7 Cappelletti op cit note 3 at 6. 
8 Clientes were foreigners who migrated to Rome and attached themselves to wealthy patrician families. 
They offered the paterfamilias political support and performed personal services. In return, the patron offered 
the client protection and assistance, especially in legal matters. The patron often represented his clients in court; 
Fernandez op cit note 4 at 10-11. ; 
9 D 1.16.9.5; D 3.1.1.4; McQuoid-Mason op cit note 2 at 1. 
10 Voet Commentarius 3.1.11; McQuoid-Mason op cit note 2 at 1. 
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formulated in the former colonies which provided for legal aid. 11 The right to legal 
representation in a criminal charge was formally recognized in article 65 of Lord Charles 
Somerset's Proclamation of 1819. 12 However, this right could only be exercised after the 
accused had pleaded to the charge and answered all judicial questions. 13 
2. Statutory and Case Law 
In 1917 the right to legal representation was given statutory recognition in terms of section 
218 of the Criminal Procedure Act 31 of 1917 and has subsequently been confirmed in 
section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.14 
The precise nature and scope of the right afforded to an accused in terms of sections 73(1) 
and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is not clearly ascertainable from the words 
used and therefore different judicial interpretations have resulted. 
11 McQuoid-Mason op cit note 2 at 2. 
12 Van der Berg,J 'Legal Representation: Right or Privilege?' 1984 THRHR (47) at 448. 
13 /oc cit, 
14 The relevant provisions of section 73 are as follows: 
(1) An accused who is arrested, whether with or without warrant, shall, subject to any 
law relating to the management" or prisons, be entitled to the assistance of his legal 
adviser as from the time of his arrest. 
(2) · An accused shall be entitled to be represented by his legal adviser at .criminal 
proceedings, if such legal adviser is not in terms of any law prohibited from 
appearing at the proceedings in question. 
Other relevant sections are: s97 of Act 31 of 1917; ss84 and 158 of Act 56 of 1955; sl66 of Act 51 of 1977. 
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The fundamental importance of the right to legal representation has been widely recognised 
by the judiciary.15 In several cases the denial of this right has been held to amount to an 
irregularity which per se vitiates the proceedings. 16 However, the courts have_}iIJ!!.ted the 
entitlement under section 73 to a right to legal representation at the accused's own 
expense. 17 Although it was regarded as a desirable practice in certain circumstances, the 
courts were loath to impose a duty on the presiding officer to inform unrepresented_ a~~~~ed_ 
of their right to legal representation. 18 The courts have also declined to impose a duty ~n 
the State to provide indigent accused with legal representation, even in cases where the death 
sentence was a possibility .19 
The first positive step, albeit a tentative one, towards broadening the ambit of the entitlement 
under section 73 was taken in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani. 20 The court argued that, given that 
15 S v Gwebu 1988 (4) SA 155 (WLD) at 159B-C; R v Slabbert 1956 (4) SA 18 (T) at 21G; S v 
Radebe; S v Mbonani 1988 (1) SA 191 (T) at 193B; S v Wessels and Another 1966 (4) SA 89 (C) at 91D-92H; 
S v Heyman and Another 1966 (4) SA 598 (AD); S v Blooms 1966 (4) SA 417 (C); S v Seheri en Andere 1964 
(1) SA 29 (A); S v Mabaso 1990 (3) SA 185 (A) at 202H-I. Although s ,73 confirms the right to legal 
representation, McQuoid-Mason op cit note 2 at 5 - notes that this right has been severely curtailed by 
legislation dealing with State security. See also S v Mabaso 1990 (3) SA 185 (A) at 202B. 
16 S v Seheri en Andere 1964 (1) SA 29 (A); S v Shabangu 1976 (3) SA 555 (A); S v Wessels 1966 
(4) SA 89 (C); S v Blooms 1966 (4) SA 417 (C); S v Nqula 1974 (1) SA 801 (E); Ndanozonme and Another 
v Nel NO and Another 1971 (3) SA 217 {E); S v Mkhize 1978 (3) SA 1065 (T). 
More recent cases include S v Gwebu 1988 (4) SA 155 (WLD); S v Tswaile 1990 (1) SACR 279 (B); S v 
Oakers 1990 (1) SACR 147 (C); S v Witbooi and Another 1990 (1) SACR 329 (Tic); S v Makeleni 1991 (1) 
SACR 299 (Tic). 
17 S v Baloyi 1978 (3) SA 290 (T) at 293F-G; Volschenk v President, SA Geneeskundige en 
Tandheelkundige Raad 1985 (3) SA 124 (A) at 140H-J. 
18 S v Mthetwa; S v Khanyile 1978 (2) SA 773 (N) at 776E; S v Baloyi (supra) at 293G-H. 
19 S v Chaane en Andere 1978 (2) SA 891 (A) 897B; R v Mari and Others 1960 (1) SA_304 (A) 306H. 
In the latter case Schreiner· JA stated that it is 'a well established and most salutary practice' that counsel is 
provided for indigent accused where the risk of a death sentence is a possibility; (306H-307 A). 
20 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
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an accused is entitled to be informed of his or her procedural rights at the outset of the trial, 
and given that one of these procedural rights is the right to legal representation, a duty rested 
with the presiding officer, depending on the complexity of the charge and the seriousness 
thereof, to inform an unrepresented accused of his or her right to legal representation and, 
furthermore, in appropriate cases, to inform such an accused of his or her right to apply for 
legal assistance from the Legal Aid Board,21 The court was, however, cautious to indicate 
that a failure by the presiding officer to comply with this duty would not necessarily vitiate 
the proceedings, but that each case would have to be assessed individually to establish 
whether there had been a failure of justice. 22 
Since the Radebe,· Mbonani decision, there have been three approaches to the imposition of 
a duty on the presiding officer to inform an accused of his or her right to legal representation 
and his or her entitlement to apply for legal aid. 
The first approach adheres to the traditional view that IIO rnle of law or practice exists in our 
- law which imposes a duty on the presiding officer to inform an unrepresented accused of his 
or her right to legal representation. 23 To support his view in this regard, Heyns J in S v 
21 Ibid at 196F-I. Goldstone J also held that the accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
endeavour to obtain legal assistance. 
22 Ibid at 1961-J. See comments by Grant,E in 'The Right to Counsel: recent developments in South 
Africa' SAC/ (1989)2 at 51-2; and in 'The right to counsel after Khanyile' SAC/ (1989)2 at 329; where Grant 
says that an evaluation of whether there has been a failure of justice in such circumstances 'depends on one's 
conception of justice. An unrepresented accused is always at a disadvantage, no matter how many times he has 
appeared in court before, or how much assistance is rendered by a presiding officer'. 
23 S v Mashiyaha 1989 (1) SA 592 (C) at 596D-E; S v Mthetwa; S v Khanyile 1978 (2) SA 773 (N) 
at 776E-F; and S v Morrison 1988 (4) SA 164 (T) at 168A-B. 
IO 
Morrison24 relies on the judgment of Schreiner JA in R v Mati and Others,25 which states 
[t]here is no rule of law that a person who is being tried for an offence that may, if 
he is convicted, result in a death sentence must, unless he objects, be defended by 
counsel. 
Furthermore, despite a reference to the rulings in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani26 and S v 
Gwebu, 27 Heyns J is still of the opinion that these djcta do not impose a duty on the 
presiding officer to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation at every 
trial. 28 
112 S v _}ef [!Shjy_(!TI_G2~d S v Mthetwa; S v Khanyile30 the courts held that where an accused 
does not indicate that he or she would like to obtain legal representation, no irregularity 
occurs when the trial is continued without such representation. In S v Mashiyana it was held 
that '[t]he unexpressed desire of an accused to engage a legal representative cannot afford 
him a cause for complaint after his conviction and sentence' [my italics]. 31 This approach 
assumes that all accused persons are aware of their rights and voluntarily choose not to 
24 1988 (4) SA 164 (T) at 168A-B. 
25 1960 (1) SA 304 (A) at 306H. 
26 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
27 1988 (4) SA 155 (WLD). 
28 S v Morrison 1988 (4) SA 164 (n at 169D-E. Coetzee J, in S v Masilela 1990 (2) SACR 116 (T) 
at 122e-f, disagrees with this interpretation of the Radebe,' Mbonani judgment by Heyns J, and says that he 
understands Goldstone J as saying that there i§. such a duty. See also criticism of this judgment by Steytler,NC 
in 'Equality before the law and the right to legal representation' SACJ (1989)2 at 67; 69-75. 
29 1989 (1) SA 592 (C) at 5941. 
30 1978 (2) SA 773 (N) at 776C-D. 
31 1989 (1) SA 592 (C) at 596E. 
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engage a legal representative. In fact, in S v Morrison32 the court is of the opinion that 
'[t]his right is generally known to most people'. 
-, 
( \ This conservative view of the right to legal representation has beenl criticised, in the 
judgments of S v Masilela, 33 S v Davids,· S v Dladla34 and Nakani v Attorney-General, 
Ciskei, and Another5 and it is submitted in light of the Appellate Division decisions in L 
v Mabaso36 and S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana, 37 which establish that a presidi.f!.g 
. officer is under a duty to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation, this 
approach is no longer acceptable in our law. 
On the other extreme there is the view that there is a peremptory duty38 on the presiding 
officer to inform an accused of this right. 39 
In _Nakani v Attorney-General, Ciskei, and Anothe,.W Heath J emphasises the vital role 
played by a legal representative in the preparation and running of a trial and describes the 
32 1988 (4) SA 164 at 167!. 
33 1990 (2) SACR 116 (T) at 122e-f. 
34 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 194H. 
35 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck) at 661B-C. 
36 1990 (3) SA 185 (A). 
_
37 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
38 By 'peremptory duty' it is meant that a failure in this duty by the presiding officer would result in 
an irregularity, which is of so fundamental and serious a nature, that the trial proceedings are per se vitiated. 
39 S v Khanyile and Another 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at SOOD; Nakani v Attorney-General, Ciskei, and 
Another 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck) at 664B. 
40 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck). 
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dire position of an unrepresented accused attempting to conduct his or her own trial as 
follows: (quoting Didcott J) 
[t]he odds are stacked against him, and stacked heavily. He knows nothing about the 
rules of evidence, rules mastered only through training and experience, rules that no 
tips he receives from the trial Court can equip him to understand fully or apply 
effectively. 41 
In support of imposing a peremptory duty on the judicial officer to inform accused persons 
of their right to legal representation (and of the advisability of obtaining it), Heath J says that 
the failure to discharge this duty in effect amounts to a denial of the right to legal 
representation. 42 The learned judge criticises the approach followed in S v Mashiyana43 
as resulting in 'a situation where it is accepted that the accused has waived his right to legal 
representation, notwithstanding the fact that he is possibly unaware of the existence or the 
importance thereof or the consequences of his failure to exercise it'. 44 
Heath J furthermore held that the presiding officer _is also under a duty to inform an accused 
person of his or her right to apply to the Legal Aid Board and various other similar 
institutions, for legal assistance. 45 In this regard Didcott J, in S v Mathebula46 suggested 
41 Ibid at 658A-H. 
42 Ibid at 659J-660B; 661D. 
43 1989 (1) SA 592 (C). 
44 1989 (3) SA 655 (CK) at 661C. See also criticism of the dictum in Mashiyana by Nienaber Jin S 
v D~vids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 194E.' 
45 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck) at_ 661E. 
46 1990 (1) SACR 20 (N). 
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that unrepresented accused seeking legal assistance can also be referred to the Law Society, 
the Bar Council, university law clinics and the Legal Resources Centre, in addition to the 
Legal Aid Board._ 
( The majority of cases47 have taken the view that the presiding. officer is under a duty t~. 
inform u~~~presented accused of their right to legal representation (an9, in most cases, of 
their right to apply for legal aid), but. t~~! t~~ ~u_tY. is. dir~tory j~ nat~re...:.4~ _ This approach 
is similar to that of Goldstone J in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani.49 There has, however, not 
been a uniform approach in the case law and individual cases will thus be discussed. 
In S v Rudman,· S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk Nd° Cooper J states that a right 
has no value if the bearer of that right is unaware of its significance. He points out that 
considering that a·large number of accused appearing in our courts are illiterate and indigent, 
'the importance to an undefended accused of being informed of his right to legal 
representation and its significance is self-evident'. 51 The learned judge is of the opinion that 
every undefended accused should be informed of his or her right to legal representation, as 
47 S v Gwebu 1988 (4) SA 155 (WLD); S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172; S v Rudman; S v 
Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E); S v Mthwana 1989 (4) SA 361 (N); S v Mkhize 
and Others 1990 (1) SACR 620 (N); S v Mabaso 1990 (3) SA 185 (A); S v Masilela 1990 (2) SACR 257 (N); 
S v Mwambazi 1991 (2) SACR 149 (Nm); Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A); S v Jansen 
1992 (1) SACR 447 (C); S v Jacobs 1991 (2) SACR 291 (C); and S v Makaula 1993 (1) SACR 57 (Tk:). 
48 Unlike in the case of a peremptory duty, a failure of a 'directory duty' does not necessarily vitiate 
the trial proceedings. See criticism by Grant in 'The right to counsel after Khanyile' op cit note 22 at 333. 
49 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
50 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 3801. 
51 Ibid at 381A. 
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well as the right to apply for legal aid.52 
A similar position was held to prevail in Namibia in the case of S v Mwambazi. 53 The court 
stated that the effect of article 12(1)(e)54 of the Namibian Constitution is that all 
unrepresented accused must be informed of their right to legal representation.55 
The judgment iri S v Rudman; S v Johnson,· S v Xaso,· Xaso v Van lfyk Nd6 can be said 
to extend the ambit of the rule laid down in S v Radebe,· S v Mbonani,51 by determining that 
the duties arise in all cases. Cooper J argues that the reason for imposing the duty in all 
cases is because there is no logical reason for limiting the cases in which the duties are 
applicable, and furthermore, that it would be improper for a court to make a ruling on 
matters which are governed by the Legal Aid Board and Legal Aid Act 22 of 1969.58 
52 Ibid at 381D-G. This view was followed in S v Mthwana 1989 (4) SA 361 (N) at 371D-E; and S 
v Mpata 1990 (2) SACR 175 (NK) at 178b. 
53 1991 (2) SACR 149 (Nm). 
54 Article 12(l)(e) provides as follows: 
All persons shall be afforded adequate time and facilities for the preparation and presentation 
of their defence, before the commencement of and during their trial, and shall be entitled to 
be defended by a legal practitioner of their choice. 
55 1991 (2) SACR 149 (Nm) at 15lc0d; 
56 1989 (3) SA 368 (E). 
57 1988 (1) SA 191 (n. In the Radebe; Mbonani judgment Goldstone J held that the duty to inform 
unreprese~ted accused of their right to legal representation ;arises especially in 'serious' cases, and the duty to 
inform an accused of his or her right to apply'for legal aid, applies in 'appropriate' cases; at 196G-H. 
58 S v Rudman; S vJohnson; S; Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 381D; H-J. This 
opinion is supported by Pannanand,SK in 'Khanyile in disarray' De Rebus (March 1990) at 209. 
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The majority of cases, including the recent Appellate Division decision in_~ Rudman,_g,nd 
Another; S v Mthwana, 59 have, however, followed the dictum in S v Radebe,· S v -- . 
Mbonani. 60 This means that the duty of a presiding officer to inform unrepresented accused 
~-·-' ..... . -
of their right to legal representation and their entitlement to apply for legal assistance, is 
restricted to acc~sed persons who ,appear to be ignorant of their rights. 61 Thus, in S v 
Mkhize, 62 Shearer J said that this duty arises in cases where the accused does not appear to 
• 
be aware of his or her rights in this regard, or it is not probable that the accused is aware 
of these rights. 
It is submitted that as the right is equally available to all accused, it is preferable to inform 
every accused of this right at the outset of the trial proceedings. 
In S v Makaula63 the court approved of the dicta in S v Radebe; S v Mbonanz-64 and S v 
Mabaso65 , regarding the duty of a judicial officer to inform accused persons of their right 
to legal representation and their entitlement to apply for legal assistance. However, Davies 
AJ says that ·due to the virtual absence of a legal aid system in Transkei, the gesture to 
59 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 391F. 
60 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
61 S v Mabaso 1990 (3) SA 185 (A) at 204G; S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 
(A) at 391G; S v Mkhize 1990 (1) SACR 620 (N) at 622e; S v Jacobs 1991 (2) SACR 291 (C) at 292d-e; S 
v Jansen 1992 (1) SACR 477(C) at 479b-480b; and S v Makaula 1993 (1) SACR 57 (Tk). 
62 1990 (1) SACR 620 (N) at 622e. Shearer J (at 622d) suggests an interesting procedure of placing 
a 'prisoner's friend' at each court, to assist indigent accused to apply for and obtain defence counsel. 
63 1993 (1) SACR 57 (Tk). 
64 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
65 1990 (3) SA 185 (A). 
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inform an accused of the possibility of legal aid is 'empty and meaningless' .66 The learned 
judge thus suggests that, in serious cases, in addition to informing unrepresented accused of 
their right to legal representation, the court should advise such accused persons that it would 
be in their interest to engage legal representation. If an accused has the means to obtain legal 
representation, the trial should be adjourned to enable the accused to engage a legal 
representative. If, however, the accused is too poor to afford a legal representative, the 
court may proceed with the trial. 67 
In all the cases discussed under this section, the courts have held that the question whether 
a failure to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation and their entitlement 
to apply for legal aid, imperils the proceedings, depends on whether the omission has 
amounted to an irregularity under section 309(3) of Act 51 of 1977.68 In terms of this 
provision, trial proceedings may be set aside if an irregularity amounts to a failure of justice 
or real prejudice to the accused. 69 
Hoexter JA, in S v Mabaso, 10 states that the question of whether a failure of justice has 
occurred depend~ on the peculiar facts of each individual case and 'the extent of the 
o6 1993 (1) SACR 57 (Tk) at 59b. 
61 Ibid at 59c-f. 
68 This section deals with the powers of a Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court in appeals 
from lower courts. See S v Rudman; S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso· v Van Wyk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 3741; 
S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 375B; S v Jansen 1992 (1) SACR 477 (C) at 
480d-e; and S v Mthwana 1989 (4) SA 361 (N) at 369D-F. 
69 S v Jansen 1992 (1) SACR 447 (C) at 480d-e. 
70 1990 (3) SA 185 (A). 
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accused's own knowledge of his rights' .71 The court in S v Mkhize.}3- suggests that the test 
to be followed is whether the accused would have chosen to be legally represented. If so, 
c:l?ffii_ydice..Js proven and a failure of justice has occurred. No further enquiry is held to 
determine whether the accused, on the evidence before the court, would in any event have 
been convicted, 'for if he had been represented matters might conceivably have turned out 
differently' .73 If the accused would not have chosen to be legally represented, then a failure 
. \ 
to inform an accused of his or her right to legal representation does not affect the 
proceedings.74 
It is interesting to note that in S v Jacobs75 Marais J held that there is prima facie always 
~
a failure of justice where an accused was not informed of his or her right to apply for legal 
aid. However, the learned judge said that if it is clear that no such choice would have been 
made, the position is different. 
The current position on the duty of a presiding officer to inform an unrepresented accused 
of his or her right to legal representation and an accused's entitlement to apply for legal aid, 
71 Ibid at 204C-D. This dictum was approved in S v G 1992 (1) SACR 568 (B) at 570b; S v Zacharia 
Masango 1990 (2) SACR 270 (B); S v Mwambazi 1991 (2) SACR 149 (Nm) at 151c-d; and S v Jacobs 1991 
. (2) SACR 291 (C) at 292d-e. 
72 19Q0 (1) SACR 620 (N) at 623a-b. 
73 Ibid at 623a-b. See also S v Shabangu 1976 (3) SA 555 (A) at 558G; S v Jansen 1992 (1) SACR 
(C) at 481a-b; S v Williams 1992 (1) SACR 260 (C); and S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 196B. 
74 1990 (1) SACR 620 (N) at 623c. See also S v Makaula 1993 (1) SACR 57 (Tk) at 59 g-h. 
Nienaber J, in S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 200B, is of the opinion that once an accused has 
been given an opportunity to obtain legal assistance and returns to court unsuccessful in this regard, the court 
may continue with the case, even if it is a complex and serious matter. No irregularity in such an instance 
would be held to have occurred. 
75 1991 (2) SACR 291 (C) at 293c. 
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can be said to only arise in 'serious cases' and where the accused appears to be ignorant of 
this right. The duty is thus not an absolute duty as a failure by the presiding officer to 
discharge this duty, may, but does not necessarily, vitiate the proceedings. 
It is submitted that in view of the large number of illiterate and indigent accused who are 
charged in our criminal courts, the knowledge of entitlement to legal representation and the 
possibility of applying for legal aid, is vital to these accused persons. The duty is a small 
one to impose on judicial officers and it is regrettable that the judgmen't in Nakani v Attomey-
General, Ciskei, and Another,76 which imposes a peremptory duty on the presiding officer 
to inform accused persons of these rights, was not followed. 
In the case of S v Khanyile and Anothern Didcott J acknowledges the progressive effects 
of Goldstone J's judgement in S v Radebe; S v Mbonani. 78 However, he chooses not to 
follow it as he feels it does not bring one 'to the heart of the matter', which, for Didcott J, 
is that to inform an unrepresented accused of his or her right to legal representation would 
make no difference to the vast majority of those being charged fri criminal courts. This is 
because 'relatively few of those charged in this country with crimes can afford to pay for the 
hire of a lawyer' .79 The learned judge thus suggests that the only constraint against the 
accused being represented is a financial one - a lack of personal finance on the one hand, and 
76 1989 (3) SA 655 (Ck) at 661B-C. 
77 1988 (3) SA 195 (N). 
78 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
79 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 800D-H. 
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a lack of funds from legal aid sources on the other. 80 
In an attempt to equate the American legal system of due process with our common law 
jurisprudence, Didcott J comes to the conclusion that as a matter of principle and policy all 
accused should be entitled to legal representation. 81 The learned judge argues that the right 
to legal represenqition is fundamental and essential to a fair trial and that a denial of this 
right renders the trial per se unfair. 82 In cases where accused persons have secured their 
own legal representation, the denial of such representation (in one form or another) has been 
regarded in such a serious light as to vitiate the proceedings.83 The plea made in S v 
Khanyile and Anothe1'4 is for the same approach should be applied to the position of 
indigent accused. 85 In other words, Didcott J argues that the right to a fair trial entails the 
right to be represented, and, in the case of indigent accused, to be so represented free of 
charge. 
80 The following sentiments have been expressed in this regard .by Nkadimeng,D 'The ·Plight of the 
Unrepresented Accused in the South African Law' African Law Review (1987) Vol I (4) at 14: 'The greatest 
flaw in the South African criminal system lies in the failure of the State to provide free or subsidised legal 
services to the indigent accused ... Time-honoured expressions like all persons being equal in the eyes of the 
law have come to mean equality before the law, if you can afford it'. 
81 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 802B-812H. This dictum was approved of in S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 
(4) SA 172 (N). See ch11pter three (ii)(a) for a discussion on the American jurisprudence. 
82 S v Khanyile and Another 1988 (3) 795 (N) at 810C-D. See comments by Van Zyl Smit in 'In 
digence and the right to counsel' SAJHR (1988) at 367; Grant 'The right to counsel: recent developments in 
South Africa' op cit note 22 at 53-57; Grant 'The right to counsel after Khanyile' op cit note 22 at 331 ; 
Davis,DM 'An impoverished jurisprudence: when is a right not a right?' SAJHR (1992) vol.8(1) at 91-2; and 
criticism by Du Plessis,JR in 'The representation of the accused' in SAU (1990) at 210. 
83 See the many cases referred to in S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 ( 4) SA 172 (N) at 193G-194C. 
84 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
85 S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N). 
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However, acknowledging the obstacles encountered in practice, the learned judge does 
qualify the cases requiring pro deo counsel. By eliminating the two extreme situations (ie 
on the one hand, those cases which are so petty that the average person would not consider 
legal representation and, on the other hand, the severe cases, such as murder and treason, 
in which pro deo counsel is provided in any case), a dense mass of cases protrudes from 
which must be identified 'those in which the call for representation is the most demanding 
and the lack of it the most debilitating' .86 
Didcott proposes the following criteria for determining whether legal representation is 
necessary to ensure a fair trial: 87 
(1) The complexity of the case with regard to both the law and the facts 
involved; 
(2) The ability of the accused to defend him or herself; and 
(3) The severity of the charge and the consequences to the accused should 
a conviction follow. 
If the judicial officer after a consideration of the above criteria decides 'that the trial would 
be palpably and grossly unfair if it were to go ahead without a lawyer for the defence', the 
officer should refer the case either to the Legal Aid Board or to a lawyer who is prepared 
86 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 8141-815D. 
81 Ibid at 815D-F. Steytler, in 'Equality before the law: being practic~l about principle' SAHJR (1992) 
vol.8(1) at 117-8, suggests that the criteria for entitlement to legal aid developed by Didcott J are too broad and 
should be defined as restrictively as possible. See further criticisms by Du Plessis op cit note 82 at 210; 
Parmanand op cit note 58 at 210, where it is suggested that the category of qualifying cases should be restricted 
capital offences or where legal representation is 'deemed essential'. 
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to act pro bono. 88 The trial would then only proceed if the accused was represented. 
Should the judicial officer decide in the negative and proceed with such a case, the above 
points might again be considered, with hindsight, by the court of appeal on review. Should 
the latter decide in the affirmative, the conviction might be overturned regardless of the 
strength of the case for the prosecution, for Didcott J argues that 'no conviction can ever be 
allowed to stand which is the product of a trial so discredited once all comes to light' .89 
In S v Rudman; S. v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van l,fyk NO90 Cooper J strongly criticizes 
the judgment in S v Khanyile and Another' as having extended the ambit of the right too 
far. He objects to the comparison drawn between the American and South African legal 
systems on the basis that our law has no Bill of Rights -
'the right to legal representation in [American] State criminal proceedings is a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment .. . [and] has no 
counterpart in the South African statute book' .rn 
Cooper J further objects to the contention that judicial power under the two systems are 'in 
essence the same'. The l~ed judge states that the South African system, having discarded 
with the jury system, requires the judicial officer to play a more active role. The assertion 
is thus that while American courts are concerned with procedural justice, the South African 
88 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 816A-C. 
89 Ibid at 816D-G. 
90 1989 (3) SA 368 (E). 
91 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
92 S v Rudman; S vJoh11son; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van i\.yk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 373B. But see the 




courts' concern is with substantial justice.93 
In the view of Cooper J, the positive investigative duties imposed on the judicial officer, as 
expounded in S v Khanyile and Another,94 are too extensive. The learned judge states that 
there are established obligations imposed on the magistrate and, in his view, adherence to 
these obligations provide sufficient assistance to the unrepresented accused. 95 However, 
Cooper J admits .that this 'in no way minimises the importance of legal representation'. 
Cooper J further argues that the legal procedure envisaged in S v Khanyile and Another96 
is simply not feasible due to a lack of personnel and an inevitable overcrowding of the 
courts. It would thus appear that the learned judge's moral considerations are outweighed 
by practical considerations. 
93 Ibid at 374B-H. 
94 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 815D-816G. 
95 S v Rudman; S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 377E-378J. This 
sentiment is echoed in FM Vorster's critique of the Radebe; Mbonani (supra) case, in which he concludes that 
'[o]ur legal system is also such that chances that accused persons who· are innocent are convicted are slender 
and I am of the opinion that there is po special need to ensure legal representation on a larger scale than that 
which already exists', in 'Legal representation in criminal cases' The Magistrate 0988)23 at 94. However, 
notice should also be taken of the assertion made in an article published in the Edinburgh Review in 1826 -
'[o]f all false and foolish dicta, the most trite and the most absurd is that which asserts that 
the judge is counsel for the prisoner ... The Judge cannot be counsel for die prisoner, ought 
not to be counsel for the prisoner, never is counsel for· the prisoner'; as quoted by Selikowitz 
op cit note 2 at 70. 
96 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
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The rule in S v Khanyile and Another91 was also not followed in S v Mpata98 and S v 
Mthwana, 99 and was finally rejected in the Appellate Division decision in S v Rudman and . 
Another; S v Mthwana. 100 
The Appellate Division in S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 101 bases its rejection of 
the Khanyile rule on three premises. It firstly argues that no right of an indigent accused to 
be provided with free legal representation (where such accused desires legal assistance) has 
been recognised by statute or court practice, 102 thereby confirming the dicta in R v Mati 
and Others103 and S v Chaane en Andere. 104 The court refers to the long history of the 
South African legal system, during which period no mention had been made that a trial in 
which an accused had been unrepresented, was judged irregular or illegal. 105 Various 
authorities are quoted which confirm that our Common Law is inherently an equitable 
97 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
98 1990 (2) SACR 175 (NC). 
99 1989 (4) SA 361 (N) at 366B-C; 369D. 
too 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 380F. 
101 loc cit. See a ~riticism of this judgment in Davis op cit note 82 at 93-5. 
102 Ibid at 380F. 
too 1960 (1) SA 304 (AD). 
104 1978 (2) 'SA 891 (A). This opinion is supported by Du Plessis op cit note 82 at 210; but see D van 
Zyl Smit op cit note 82 at 364 for a contrary opinion. 
105 Ibid at 378D-I. See also Nienaber J's judgment~ S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 
199F, where he states that '[a] point so conspicuous, emerging from one of the fundamentals of fairness, if 
good, could never have been overlooked - not by the Judges in S v Chaane (1978 (2) SA 891 (A)) nor by 
generations of other Judges dealing with a multitude of cases, duplicating the very situation described in S v 
Khanyile (1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
24 
system, 106 and it is argued that several judge-made rules have evolved to render assistance 
to undefended accused to ensure that they receive a fair trial. 107 
The court agrees with Didcott J that 'it is a fundamental principle of our law that an accused 
person is entitled to a fair trial. 108 However, it argues that the issue to be determined is 
not whether the trial of an accused who was unrepresented (not by choice, but because of 
indigency of ignorance of his or her right to legal representation) was unfair, but whether, 
on the facts of the case, an irregularity occurs in terms of section 309 (3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.109 
It has invariably been held that an irregularity or illegality in criminal proceedings occurs 
when there has been a departure from those formalities, rules and principles of procedure in 
accordance with which the law requires a criminal trial to be initiated or conducted' .110 
Nienaber J111 says that only those irregularities which result in a failure of justice, due to 
106 Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Another 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) at"606A; Kent 
v Transvaalsche Bank 1907 TS 765 at 774; and R v Mbamali and Xaba 1938 NPD 2 at 9. See also Voet I.1.6; 
Huber HR 1.1.17, 18, 21. 
107 S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 380F; 381E-382D; S v Mthwana 
1989 (4) SA 361 (N) at 366B-C; S v Mpata 1990 (2) SACR 175 (NC) at 179h-j. For a discussion on these 
rights, see S v Rudman; S v Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 377E-379A; and 
S v Radebe; S v Mbonani 1988 (1) SA 191 (T) at 194H-195D. 
108 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at369D-E. See also R v 1hielke 1918 AD 373 at 376; S v Mofokeng 1962 (3) 
SA 551 (A) at 557G-H; S v Alexander and Others (l) 1965 (2) SA 796 (A) at 809C-D; and S v Tyebela 1989 
(2) SA 22 (A) at 29G-H. -
109 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 375B; 377B-C. See also S v Mthwana 1989 (4) SA 36~ (N) at 369D-F. See 
Davis op cit note 82 at 93-5, for a criticism of the restricted scope of a right to a fair trial given by the 
Appellate Division in this case. · · 
110 Per Williamson JA in S v Mofokeng 1962 (3) SA 551 (A) at 557G-H. See also S v Xaba 1983 (3) 
SA 717 (A) at 728D. 
111 In S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 193E-F. 
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prejudice to the accused, can be fatal. Furthermore, if the facts of the case, which are 
untainted by the irregularity, still justify a conviction, the proceedings will not be set 
aside. 112 
The court, secondly, argues that in principle, the implementation of the Khanyile rule would 
'constitute notice .to the Government that if legal aid on the required scale is not provided, 
the prospect will have to be faced of numerous criminal trials being delayed and many 
convictions being upset on appeal because of the failure to provide the accused person with 
legal representation'. 113 The court is hereby arguing that it does not have the power to 
impose a positive duty on the State to provide accused persons with legal aid.114 
The final premise on which the court bases its rejection of the Khanyile rule, is that it is of 
the opinion that a confirmation of this would require the judiciary to make decisions on 
administrative policy, 'which takes the matter beyond the courtroom'. The court, however, 
does not reject the project out of hand as unworkable, but says that feasibility studies will 
have to be done in this area to determine to possibility of implementing such a scheme. 115 
112 S v Tuge 1966 (4) SA 565 (A) at 568F; S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 193F. 
113 S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 386G-H. 
114 Ibid at 386H-I. But see Steytler op cit note 87 at 115-116, where he points out that the courts have 
previously placed a positive duty on the State to provide accused persons with interpreters in Supreme Court 
trial proceedings. · 
115 In S v,Mthwana 1989 (4) SA 361 (N) at 370.E and S v Mpata 1990 (2) SACR 175 (N) at 179j-180a 
the courts reject the Khanyile rule as being unworkable as, it is held, the funds are simply not available to cope 
with the flood of cases that will have to be provided with representation. This view is supported by Malan,JF 
in 'Die reg op regsverteenwoordiging in die Jig van sekere fundamentele beginsels' Obiter (1992) 55-84 at 82; 
and by Du Plessis op cit note 82 at 215. But see the feasibility studies done by McQuoid-Mason,DJ in 'The 
right to legal representation: implementing Khanyile's case' SACJ (1989)2 at 57-66; and McQuoid-Mason 
'Rudman and the right to counsel: is it feasible to implement Khanyile?' SA/HR (1992) vol.8(1) at 96-113; as 
well as the suggestion by Plasket,C in 'Legal assistance: a cost-effective answer to Rudman' SAJHR (1992) 
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In conclusion, it can be said that the court in S v. Khanyi/e and Another 116 attempted to 
bring the South African law .on the issue of the provision, by the State, of legal 
representation, in line with international developments in this area, by determining that the 
right to be provided with legal representation is a corollary to the initial right to legal 
representation. However, the Appellate Division in S v Rudman and Another; S v 
Mthwana 117 has refused to. follow this approach. Besides confirming the rule in S v 
Radebe; S v Mbonani118 that there is a directory duty on the presiding officer to inform 
unrepresented accused of their right to legal representation and of their entitlement to apply 
for legal aid, it can be said, the overall effect of the Appellate Division decision has been to 
maintain the status quo. 
This position may, however, change with the adoption of a Bill of Rights in South Africa. 
The possibility of broadening the scope of the right to legal representation will depend on 
two factors, namely the actual wording of the entitlement and the manner in which the courts 
choose to interpret the document. These two aspects will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
vol.8(1) at 119-125, of offering legal 'assistance' as opposed to legal representation, based 9n the English 
concept of a McKenzie Friend. 
116 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
117 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
118 1988 (1) SA 191 (T). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING BILLS OF RIGHTS 
The courts have not followed a common approach to interpretation, whether it be the 
interpretation of a contractual clause, a statutory provision or of a guarantee in terms of a 
bill of rights. The chosen interpretative method can have a substantial impact on the ambit 
of the application of the provision or right in question. 
There are two main approaches followed in judicial interpretation: the first is a restrictive 
approach, the thrust of which is to ascertain the original intention of the drafter or legislator 
from the words used in the text, without reference to external factors possibly pertaining to 
the document. 1 The other is a 'purposive' approach according to which the interpreter 
considers the document 'as a whole to ascertain the social ends it was intended to achieve and 
the practical means by which it was expected to achieve them' .2 Depending on which 
method of interpretation is followed, different results may be achieved. . . 
The interpretation of a document containing entrenched fundamental human rights and 
freedoms differs, in some respects, from that of a statute or a contract, in the sense that '[a] 
bill of rights regime requires rules of interpretation aimed at upholding fundamental freedoms 
1 Du Plessis,LM ( 1986) The Interpretation of Statutes. at 35. 
2 Lord Diplock, quoted in Devenish,GE (1992) Interpretation of Statutes at 37; Nyamakazi v President 
of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) SA 540 at 549G. 
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rather than upholding the Legislature' .3 The opinion is that although reference may be made 
to the rules of interpretation of statutes, a bill of rights should be interpreted 'according to 
those general principles which usually govern the construction of other fundamental laws' .4 
However, the courts broadly apply the same interpretative approaches, outlined above, to 
both types of documents. Each of these approaches will now be discussed in tum. 
1. Restrictive interpretation 
Followers of this approach state that 'the paramount rule to be observed is that the 
[document] is to be expounded according to its expressed or manifested intention'5 and that 
the true meaning of the text must be sought in the ipsissima verba used by the framers of the 
document. 6 The only situations which allow for a departure from the ordinary grammatical 
meaning of the words used in the -text, are interpretations which lead to ambiguity, unjust or 
unreasonable results. 7 Devenish refers to this theory as one of 'qualified contextualism', as 
the broader considerations of the context of the words in the text are only considered in the 
above exceptional circumstances. 8 Thus, the court in Smith v Attorney-General, 
Bophuthatswana9 held that it would only consider the intention of the drafter if more than 
3 S v Chabalala 1986 (3) SA 623 (BA) at 627J-628A; Manning,M (1983) Rights, Freedoms and the 
Courts: a practical analysis of the Constitution Act, 1982 at 84. 
4 Rotunda et al. (1986) Treatise on Constitutional Law: substance and procedure at 491. · 
5 R v Westenraad 1941 OPD 103 at 105. 
6 Du Plessis. op cit note 1 at 31. 
7 Devenish op cit note 2 at 28. 
8 Zoe cit. 
9 1984 (1) SA 194 (B) at 199B-F. 
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one reasonable construction of the provision is possible. 
A similar approach was followed in S v Marwane 10 where Miller JA says that 
'whether 01:1r Courts were to regard an Act creative of a Constitution as it would any 
other statute, or as an Act sui generis, when construing a particular provision therein, 
they would give effect to the ordinary accepted meaning and effect of the words used 
and would not deviate therefrom unless to give effect to the ordinary meaning would 
give rise to glaring absurdity' .11 
i 
·l.!··· 
The application of a restrictive interpretation to a legislative provision or entrenched human 
right can have debilitating results. 
In the Canadian case of Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v The Queen12 McIntyre J, in a 
dissenting judgmc:::nt, in arguing that there is no constitutional right to an abortion in Canada, 
stated that in determining whether legislation is contrary to the democratic values protected 
by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 'the courts must confine themselves to such 
democratic values as are clearly found and expressed in the Charter and refrain from 
imposing or creating other values not so based' .13 
This appears to be a very narrow reading of the Canadian Charter, as such a document could 
lO 1982 (3) SA 717 (A). 
11 Ibid at 749B-C. 
12 (1988) 37 CCC (3d) 449. 
13 Ibid .at 529 [my italics]. 
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not possibly contain all democratic rights and freedoms which it protects. It is submitted that 
the concept of democracy in itself implicitly demands a broader interpretation, as there are 
invariably contradictory issues in terms of these rights and freedoms which need to be 
considered. 
The two Bophuthatswana cases of S v Chabalala14 and Government of the Republic of 
Bophuthatswana and Others v Segale15 serve to illustrate how a positivist approach to the 
interpretation of a bill of rights can severely curtail entrenched human rights and freedoms. 
In S v Chabalala16 the question to be determined was whether the death sentence (as 
sanctioned by section 10 of Act 18 of 1977 (B)) amounted to 'inhuman and degrading 
treatment' in contravention of the provisions of section 11 of the Bophuthatswana 
Constitution Act 18 of 1977(B).17 
The court equatep the interpretation of the provisions of a Bill of Rights with that of a 
contract. The court was of the opinion that when interpreting a contract, in certain 
circumstances, absurd results may be achieved from a too literal interpretation of the words 
used in the text and that the nature and purpose of the contract as a whole and its provisions 
within that contract, need to be considered. 18 Applying this rea~oning to the provisions of 
14 1986 (3) SA 623 (BA). 
15 1990 (1) SA 434 (BA). 
16 1986 (3) SA 623 (BA). 
17 Ibid at 625H-I. 
18 Ibid at 62_8G-H. 
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the Bill of Rights in question, the court accordingly stated that '[s]ection 11 must be 
[interpreted] within the framework of the Bill of Rights, [and] not in isolation or in 
contradistinction to its remaining provisions'. 19 Read in this fashion the court was able to 
uphold the other sections in the document which refer to punishment or imprisonment as 
valid, provided that these provisions were not executed in a 'degrading and inhuman 
manner'. 20 
It would appear that the above line of argument allows the court to avoid the main question 
of whether the death penalty itself amounts to 'degrading and inhuman' treatment or 
punishment, and is therefore in contravention of section 11 of the Bill of Rights. 
The court further strengthened its view by arguing that, by enacting section 10, the 
representatives of the people of Bophuthatswana expressly conveyed their acceptance of the 
death penalty in certain circumstances being an appropriate punishment.21 This statement 
could be considered to be in line with the court's approach to statutory interpretation, in that 
the intention of the Legislature must be sought in the plain meaning of the words. With 
regard to the legitimacy of section 27722 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the 
court accepted its validity as having been incorporated into the legal system of 
Bophuthatswana by section 93(1) of the Constitution.23 This argument of the court appears . 
19 Ibid at 628H-I. 
20 Ibid at 6281-J. 
21 Ibid at 629C-E. 
22 This section provides for a mandatory death sentence, except in certain circumstances. 
23 Ibid at 630F-G. 
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to follow an even more restrictive approach than a literal interpretation would, as the court 
is in effect interpreting that which has not been expressly stated. 
The above interpretations appears to be contradictory to the idea that a Bill of Rights is, in 
the first instance, concerned with upholding the rights and freedoms valued in a democratic 
society, rather than the statutory provisions of legislation. 
The case of Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana v Segale was concerned with 
section 31 of the Internal Security Act 32 of 1979 (B) (which prohibits gatherings or meeting 
of more than twenty people which have a political character) and whether it was ultra vires 
sections 15 and 16, of the Bophuthatswana Constitution Act 18 of 1977 (B) (which guarantee 
the rights of freedom of expression and of assembly, respectively).24 The appellants argued 
that the intrusion on these fundamental rights was necessary to maintain public safety and 
order. 25 
The court relied on the approaches followed in S v Marwane26 and Smith v Attorney-
General, Bophuthatswana21 (discussed above), as authority to adopt a positivist approach' 
whereby statutes are applied according to their strict meaning as construed from the words 
used. 28 Galgut AJA, furthermore, chose not to interpret Hiemstra CJ's remark in the Smith 
24 1990 (1) SA 434 (BA) at 4411. 
25 Ibid at 441J. 
26 1982 (3) SA 717 (A). 
27 1984 (1) SA 196 (B). 
28 Ibid at 199F. 
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case, that the interpretation of the guarantees in a Bill of Rights is different and contrary to 
a positivist interpretation,29 as suggesting that the court may deviate from the ordinary 
meaning of the words used by Parliament.30 The court was thus of the opinion that the 
intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words of the text as used in their 
context and that if this intention is clear and unambiguous, '[i]t is not for the Courts to invent 
fancied ambiguities and usurp the functions. of the Legislature' .31 
The court proceeded to interpret the provisions protecting national security and public safety, 
contained in sections 15(2)32 and 16(2)33 of Act 18 of 1977 (B), as circumscribing the 
rights of freedom of expression and of assembly, guaranteed in sections 15(1) and 16(1) 
respectively. 34 
The court appears to have ignored the second criterion (contained in sections 15(2) and 16(2)) 
that the restrictions on the guaranteed rights must be necessary in a democratic society. This 
criterion is one of the pillars of the Bill of Rights which entrenches fundamental rights and 
freedoms and I submit that this places a heavier burden of proof on the State to justify any 
encroachment upon these important rights and freedoms. 
29 Ibid at 199F. 
30 1990 (1) SA 434 at 4471. 
31 Ibid at 448G-H. 
32 Section 15(2): The· exercise of the right of expression ... may be subject to such ... restrictions as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, ... or public 
safety . .'. 
33 This section reads the same as section 15(2) - see note 32. 
34 Ibid at 449C. 
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It can be argued that in both the above judgments the respective courts effectively nullified 
the fundamental guarantees which the Bophuthatswana Bill of Rights attempts to uphold. 
Such an interpretative approach to a bill of rights has the effect of stifling the development 
of individual protected rights and freedoms and is contrary to the spirit of a human rights 
document. 
2. Purposive interpretation 
The 'purposive' theory looks to the purpose behind enacting specific provisions in a statute 
or enshrining certain guarantees in a constitution. In other words, 'it refers to legislative 
goals that transc~nd a particular application'. 35 Thus, Devenish says that an unqualified 
contextual approach is called for, allowing examination of 'all internal and external 
sources'. 36 A purposive interpretation can have the effect of broadening the ambit of an 
entitlement significantly. 
The case law emanating from the jurisdictions of the United States of America, Canada and 
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights37 
will be examined to establish the potential of the purposive theory to broaden the scope of 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in human rights documents. The reason for choosing 
these three jurisdictions is because the rights and freedoms entrenched in the various 
35 Devenish op cit note 2 at 35. 
36 Ibid at 36 .. 
37 The European Court of Human Righis and the Commission on Human Rights were set up to 
supervise the observance by the contracting States of their engagements arising from the European Convention 
on Human Rights; P Van Dijk & GJH Van Hoof (1990) Theory and Practice of the European Convelllion on 
Human Rights at 20. 
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proposals for a future South African Bill of Rights are in many respects similar to those 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the American Bill of Rights as contained in the Constitution. They can 
provide useful guidance in the area of purposeful interpretations, especially with regard to 
the right to be provided with legal representation. 
2.1. Case law of the United States of America 
The general approach of the American courts, when interpreting the Constitution, is to 
interpret the intention and meaning of the provisions with reference to the purpose of their 
enactment. 38 In other words, the language of the Constitution must be construed in such 
a way as to further the instrument's general purpose.39 In the case of Landry v Klopman,40 
it was held that 'an adherence to the letter and a violation of the spirit of the instrument 
ought not to be, tolerated or supposed possible'. 
However, where there is no ambiguity in a clause and the meaning of it is clear, the courts 
sometimes state that in such a case it is not necessary to ascertain the intention of the drafters 
of the document. 41 This approach is qualified by the requirement that the Constitution must 
always be afforded a 'reasonable interpretation', having due regard to the significance of the 
38 Rotunda et al op cit note· 4 at 490. 
39 Ibid at 493. 
40 13 La Ann 345 (1858) 345-6; quoted by Rotunda et al. op cit note 4 at 490. 
41 Rotunda et al. op cit note 4 at 491. 
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terms of the document.42 It is further a general principle that the Constitution should be 
construed as a whole, according to which the individual provisions are considered in 
conjunction with the other clauses. 43 
Another important aspect of the interpretative approach to the American Bill of Rights was 
raised in Gompers v United States44 where the court held that 
[t]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their 
essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from English 
soil. Their significance is a vital, not formal one; it is to be gathered not simply by 
taking the words and a dictionary but by considering their origin and the line of their 
growth. 
The courts are of the view that the Constitution was designed to take account of changing 
social, political and economical events, and therefore tend to follow a broad and flexible 
approach to interpreting the guarantees protected by .the Bill of Rights.45 
2.2. Case law of Canada 
The Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 contains a Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
42 Ibid at 491. 
43 Ibid at 492. 
44 (1914) 233 US 604 at 610; quotedby Friedman Jin Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992 
(4) SA 540 at 550F. . 
45 Ibid at 495 - the Supreme Court has been referred-to as a 'continual Constitutional Convention'. See 
also the cases referred to by Friedman J in this regard, in Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) 
SA 540 at 549H-550E. 
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Section 1 of the Charter provides: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The effect of the above section, regarding the protection of rights and freedoms, differs from 
that of the American Bill of Rights, in that the guaranteed rights are not absolute.46 
However, Strayer says that there is a presumption in favour of the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Charter. 47 
The courts have used similar arguments to the American courts to broaden the scope of the 
guarantees entrenched in the Charter or to strike down legislation which is contrary to these 
guarantees. 
The majority judgment in the case of Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v The Queen48 is a 
good example of purposive interpretation by a court. The matter concerned the validity of 
section 251 of the Criminal Code which prohibits abortions, except under special 
circumstances set out in ss(4). The court held that by forcing a woman to carry a foetus to 
term contrary to her own priorities and aspirations amounts to an interference with her bodily 
integrity which is a violation of the right to security of persons, as guaranteed by section 7 
46 In terms of the American Bill of Rights, the rights are generally proclaimed in absolute terms and 
the courts have had to debate possible limitations on these rights. Strayer,BL (1983) The Canadian Constitution 
and the Couns at 58. 
41 Ibid at 59. 
48 (1988) 37 CCC (3d) 449. 
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of the Charter. 49 
In reaching this conclusion the court followed the approach that '[t]he goal of Charter 
interpretation is to secure for all people the full benefit of the Charter's protection'. 50 It 
was thus held that account must be taken of the purpose of the legislation, as well as 'the 
administrative procedures created by law to bring that purpose into operation' as these 'may 
produce unconstitutional effects and such legislation should be struck down'. 51 
The court held that the rights guaranteed by the Charter must be analysed in terms of the 
interests that are meant to be protected thereby. 52 Manning is in agreement with this 
approach as he says that '[u]nlike other statutes a Constitution must be interpreted in a way 
that is most appropriate in order to realize its aims and objectives; not in such a way as to 
restrict those aims and objectives' .53 
2.3. Case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on 
Human Rights 
When interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights the European Court of Human 
Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as the Court 
49 Ibid at 446-9. 
so Ibid at 462. 
51 Ibid at 470. 
52 Ibid at 462. 
53 Manning op cit note 3 at 84. 
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and the Commission respectively) base their approach on the directions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.54 Article 31 determines that '[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and its purpose' .55 Thus Merrills 
states that the Court interprets the words in an article in their contextual setting and against 
the background of the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole.56 Regard is 
furthermore given to the broader concerns which the treaty wishes to address, when 
determining the meaning of the treaty. 57 
The important issue to be determined is the degree of relevance of the notions the 'object' 
and 'purpose' of a treaty. There appears to be two schools of thought in this regard. The 
one approach restricts the relevance of the object of the treaty to the extent that it is reflected 
in the words used. The other approach interprets and supplements the terms in the treaty by 
reference to the object and purpose of the treaty, as ascertained from the treaty itself and 
from other evidence.58 The Court's approach appears to fall somewhere between these two 
schools: when interpreting the text it relies on the ordinary meaning of the words, but is 
. . 
always mindful that the object of the Convention is the protection of human rights. 59 Thus 
54 23 May 1969. The Vienna Convention is, however, not yet itself in force. Articles of this 
Convention which are referred to in particular, are articles 31 to 33. 
at 63. 
55 Merrills,JG (1988) The development of international law by the European Coun of Human Rights 
56 Ibid at 66. 
51 Ibid at 70. 
58 Ibid at 70-1. 




the Court would,_ in light of the purpose of the Convention, construe any restrictions on 
rights provided for in the Convention, narrowly.60 
Another important feature of the Court's approach to interpreting the guarantees enshrined 
in the Convention, is its regard of the Convention as a 'living instrument'. The Court 
accordingly takes cognisance of contemporary conditions and conceptions of modern 
society. 61 An example of this attitude of the Court can be seen in the Tyrer case (1978), 
where it was held that birching of a juvenile amounted to degrading punishment in 
contravention of article 3 of the European Convention.62 
The above discussion on restrictive and purposive interpretation, clearly illustrates the drastic 
impact a particular interpretative method can have on a provision or entrenched right. 
As mentioned in chapter one, two approaches to the entrenchment of the right to legal 
representation in a future South African Bill of Rights can be discerned. The Government 
Charter and the South African Law Commission interim Report of 1991 only place a duty 
on a presiding officer to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation and of 
their right to apply for legal assistance. The ANC Bill of Rights, the Charter for Social 
Justice and the South African Law Commission Report of 1989 make special provision for 
unrepresented accused to be provided with legal representation when the interests of justice 
so require. Neither of the provisions can be said to be fully circumscribed and will therefore 
60 Zoe cit. 
61 Ibid at 74. 
62 Zoe cit. 
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, 
be open to judicial interpretation. In the chapters following, each approach will be subjected 
to a restrictive and a purposive interpretation. From this the possible ambit of the right to 
legal representation as provided for in these two approaches will be investigated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERPRETING A LIMITED RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION' 
In this chapter I shall discuss the right to legal representation as enshrined in the Government 
draft Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and the South African Law Commission interim 
Report on Group and Human Rights, 1991. 
Clause 261 of the (present) Government's draft Charter of Fundamental Human Rights is 
very similar to that devised by the South African Law Commission in its interim report. 2 
These proposals can be said to be based on the dictum in the Appellate Division decision in 
S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana. 3 Because of the similarity of the two proposals, 
I shall, for the purpose of further discussion refer mainly to the Government Charter. 




Every accused shall have the right: 
to be represented by a legal practitioner at own expense; 
to be informed by the presiding officer regarding: 
(i) his or her right to be assisted by a legal practitioner; and 
(ii) the institution that he or she may approach for legal assistance, and to be 
given a reasonable opportunity to attempt to obtain legal assistance. 
Any infringement of the rights of an accused referred to in subsection (l)(d) or (g) 
shall not result in the setting aside of the proceedings unless the court on appeal or 
review finds that justice has not been done. 
2 Project 58: Group and Human Rights; August 1991. 
Article 7: Every accused person has the right -
(e) to be represented by a legal practitioner; 
(t) to be informed by the presiding officer -
(i) of his or her right to be represented by a legal practitioner~ 
(ii) of the institutions which he or she may approach for legal assistance; 
and to be given a reasonable opportunity to endeavour to obtain legal assistance: Provided that 
failure or neglect so to inform an accused person or to gi,ve him or .her such opportunity shall 
not result in the setting aside of the proceedings unless on appeai or review a court finds that 
justice was not done. 
3 1992 (I) SA 343. See chapter two for a discussion on this case. 
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Briefly stated, article 7 (e) of the Law Commission's Report confirms an accused's 
fundamental right to legal representation. Subsection 7(t) obliges the presiding officer to 
inform an unrepresented accused of his or her right to be represented by a legal practitioner 
and to advise such accused of institutions which may be approached for legal assistance. 
Furthermore, an accused must be granted a reasonable opportunity to endeavour to obtain 
legal assistance. A trial may, however, be continued if the accused was unable to obtain 
representation in the time specified. 
The actual provision of the right to legal representation need not be the last word spoken on 
the matter. An entitlement to be provided with legal representation could still be possible 
depending on whether a court interpreting the Government Charter follows a restrictive or 
purposive interpretation. 
1. Restrictive interpretation 
The essence of a restrictive approach is that it looks at the letter of the provision without 
taking any other factors into consideration. By interpreting sections of a document in 
isolation, provisions which are potentially at odds with one another may go unnoticed or be 
deliberately ignored. 
The traditional literal approach expounded in the Bophuthatswana cases, discussed in chapter 
three, and the judgment in S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana4 will be used as a basis 
for a restrictive interpretation of the right to legal representation as enshrined in the 
4 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
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Government Charter (clause 26) and the Law Commission report of 1991 (article 7(t)). 
By applying a strict reading of the letter of the law, it can be argued that the only right which 
is guaranteed in clause 26 of the Government Charter, is the right to legal representation at 
the accused's own expense5• 
The duties imposed on a presiding officer in terms of clause 26(g),6 to inform accused 
persons of their right to legal representation and to apply for legal aid are not absolute, as 
the trial proceedings will only be vitiated if, on appeal it is found that a failure by the 
presiding officer to comply with these duties has amounted to a failure of justice. 
In S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana7 the court held that the question whether an 
irregularity has occurred depends on 'whether there has been any irregularity or illegality, 
that is a departure from the formalities, rules and principles of procedure in according to 
which our law requires a criminal trial to be initiated or conducted'. This type of enquiry 
excludes the broad notions of 'basic fairness and justice'. 8 It was similarly held in R v 
Mbamali and Xaba9 that 'under our review jurisdiction we have only to confirm proceedings 
where they are in accordance with justice ... but "justice" does not mean some standard of 
equity existing in the mind of the Court independent of the actual provisions of the law; we 
5 7(e); Clause 26(t) of Government charter. 
6 And article 7(t) of the Law Commission Report, 1991. 
7 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 377C. See also S v Mofokeng 1962 (3) SA 551 (A) at 557. . . . 
8 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 378B. 
9 1938 NPD 2 at 9. 
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have to administer justice in accordance with the law'. 
As no express provision has been made for free legal assistance, the court (or State) is not 
obliged to provide an unrepresented accused with funded legal representation or to render any 
further assistance than the above-mentioned advice. There are a number of judge-made rules 
which have been designed over the years to assist unrepresented accused to ensure that a fair 
trial results and therefore the lack of legal representation can no_t be said to amount to an 
unfair trial. 10 
Therefore, by applying a literal interpretation to the provisions on entitlement to legal 
representation, it can be argued that the intention of the drafters was not to entrench a right 
to be provided with legal representation, but only to make it incumbent on a presiding officer 
to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation, as well as their right to apply 
for legal aid. It can said that if such an interpretation is applied, the Government Charter's 
provision for legal representation merely entrenches the current position in South African law 
as part of the supreme law of the country and thus any further growth on the issue is 
stultified. 
2. Purposive interpretation 
As established in section 1 above, there is no provision in either of the South African Bills 
of Rights of the Government or the South African Law Commission Report of 1991, which 
expressly entitle an unrepresented accused to free legal representation. However, neither the 
10 S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A) at 378D-J. 
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American Bill of Rights, nor the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide 
specifically for such a right either. In American law the Sixth Amendment11 was originally 
understood to entitle an accused to a legal representative of his or her own choice and 
expenditure. 12 However, through a process of creative and progressive interpretation the 
courts have developed the scope of the right to legal representation to include the right of an 
indigent accused to be provided with legal representation. 13 
An exposition of the development of the right to be provided with legal representation in 
American and Canadian case law will be discussed to illustrate how an apparently limited 
right can substantially be expanded by following a purposive approach to interpretation. The 
developments made in terms of the notion of a fair trial in case law emanating from the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights is also 
relevant to this discussion. Reference made to American, Canadian and European 
(Convention) jurisprudence is justified on the grounds that the proposed bill of rights for 
South Africa will place our legal system on a similar legal basis as the other three 
systems. 14 
11 Sixth Amendment: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to the assistance 
of counsel for his defence'. 
12 Perkins,RM (1984) Criminal Law and Procedure at 1069. 
13 Powell v Alabama 287 US 45 (1932); Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963); Douglas v 
California 372 US 353 (1963); Argersinger v Hamlin 401 US 25 (1972). 
· 14 Article 1 of the Government Charter determines that the rights under the charter are fundamental 
and binding on all legislative, executive and judicial institutions. Cooper J's critique, in S, v Rudman; S v 
Johnson; S v Xaso; Xaso v Van Wyk NO 1989 (3) SA 368 (E) at 373J-374A, of Didcott J's reliance on 
American jurisprudence in S v Khanyile 1988 (3) SA 795 (N), as being invalid because the South African 
principle of a fair trial can not be compared to the American concept of due process, on the basis that our 
system does not have a Bill of Rights, will itself no longer be valid. 
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2.1. American case law 
The two Amendments of the American Bill of Rights, which are relevant to this discussion, 
are the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The Sixth Amendment entitles an accused 
to legal representation at a criminal trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all 
persons equal protection of the law, as well as due process of law against State action. The 
latter two concepts of 'equal protection' and 'due process' provided the basis for the 
development of t~e right to be provided with legal representation. is 
The notion of due process was expounded on by Frankfurter J in Solesbee v Blakcom, 16 as 
follows: 
[i]t is now the settled doctrine of this court that the Due Process Clause embodies a 
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the tradition and 
feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived 
by our whole history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions 
of what is fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are the less like! y 
they are to be explicitly stated. But respectfor them is of the very essence of the Due 
Process Clause. 
From the above it would appear that the essence of 'due process' is that it embodies the 
Common Law requirement of a fair trial. 17 The court in Gideon v Wainwright18 argued 
IS Johnson v Zerbst 304 US 458 (1937); Betts v Brady 316 US 455 (1941); Gideon v Wainwright 372 
US 335 (1963); Argersinger v Hamlin 407 US 25 (1972). 
16 339 US 9 (1950) at 16. See also Screws v United States 325 US 91 (1945). 
17 Miller,LW 'Right to Counsel: State Courts on the Front Line' Annual Survey of American Law 
(1984) Vol.l at 184. 
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therefore that because the nature of the adversarial process (which forms the basis of the 
American criminal procedure system), places the onus on the parties to advance their own 
case, it is unfair to require laypersons to defend themselves against legally trained 
prosecutors. The plight of the undefended accused is explained as follows by Sutherland J 
in Powell v Alabama: 19 
[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with crime he is incapable generally of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper 
charge and convicted upon incompetent evidence or evidence irrelevant to the issue 
or otherwise · inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to 
prepare his defence, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 20 
The court in Gideon v Wainwright21 thus held that the due process clause enshrined in the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the accused is placed on an equal footing with the 
prosecutor, which in tum means that an unrepresented accused must be provided with legal 
representation (if he or she desires it and is indiger1t). In Powell v Alabama22 Sutherland J 
held that (in capital cases) where an accused is unrepresented due to indigence and lacks the 
18 372 US 335 (1963) at 339; 341-5. 
19 287 US 45 (1932) at 68-9. 
20 See also the judgment in Johnson v Zerbst 304 US 458 (1937) at 462-3, where Black J expresses 
a similar opinion that the law is too complicated to expect the layperson to successfully present a possibly valid 
defence to the court. 
21 372 US 335 (1963) at 345. 
22 287 US 45 (1932) at 71-2. 
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ability to defend him or herself ( either 'because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, 
or the like'), due process of law requires a court to appoint a legal representative to defend 
such an accused. 
The right to be provided with counsel originally applied only in capital cases23 and in 
'special circumstances' .24 However, in Argersinger v Hamlin25 the court held that the 
entitlement of the right to counsel could not depend on the classification of a crime as serious 
or petty, or as a felony or a misdemeanour. The right to counsel was thereby extended to 
cases which entail the loss of personal liberty. 26 
It is of interest to note the separate opinion in the above case, of Powell J, who agrees with 
the result of the judgment, but not with the scope of the right, for the learned judge argues 
that '[w]hen the deprivation of property right and interest is of sufficient consequence, 
denying the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is 
a denial of due process'. 27 In casu, the accused had received a jail sentence and therefore, 
the majority of the court declined to consider whether the-right extends to cases where the 
loss of life or liberty was not at issue. The upshot of this was that the court in Scott v 
Illinois28 was able to limit the right to cases where a sentence of imprisonment was imposed 
23 Powell v Alabama 287 US 45 (1932). 
24 Betts v Brady 316 US 455 (1941). 
25 407 us 25 (1972). 
26 Ibid at 37. 
27 Ibid at 48. 
28 440 US 367 (1979) at 369; Miller op cit note 17 at 179. 
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and not to extend it to cases where it was merely a competent verdict. 
The other leg of the argument concerns the entitlement to equal protection of the law. Black 
J, in a dissenting judgment in Betts v Brady,29 states that equal justice under the law entails 
that all accused persons must be placed in the same position when faced with a criminal 
charge. Therefore, although the court in Douglas v Califomia30 stated that absolute equality 
is not required, no distinction is to be drawn on the basis of financial status, otherwise '[t]he 
indigent ... [can be said to only have] the right to a meaningless ritual, whilst the rich man 
has a meaningful appeal'. 31 
The courts have t~us by means of 'active' judicial interpretation used the notions of 'equality 
of all before the law' and 'due process', to establish the following principles: 
(i) no accused person should be convicted without a fair trial; and 
(ii) legal representation is fundamental and essential to a fair trial. 32 
2.2. Canadian case law 
In Canada the courts have used the principles of 'fundamental justice' (as enshrined in section 
29 316 US 455 (1941) at 476-7. 
30 372 US 353 (1963) at 357. 
31 Ibid at 358. 
32 Miller op cit note 17 at 184. By means of similar interpretative methods, the courts have, also 
extended the entitlement to counsel during certain pre-trial proceedings, such as preliminary hearings (Coleman 
v Alabama 399 US 1 (1970)) entrances of pleas (White v Maryland 373 US 59 (1963)), arraignments (Hamilton 
v Alabama 368 US 52 (1961)) and pre-trial identification line-ups (United States v Wade 388 US 218 (1967); 
and Gilbert v California 388 US 263 ( 1967). 
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733 of the Charter) and 'fair trial' (as entrenched in section ll(d)34) to establish a right to 
free legal representation, in certain circumstances. 
In the case of R v Deutsch35 the court argued that under the common law art accused has 
the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, section 7 entrenches the right of an accused not to be 
deprived of his or her liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, 
and section 1 l(d) entrenches the right to a fair hearing. The court thus argues that the right 
to fundamental justice and to a fair hearing includes the right to a fair trial. The court 
concludes thatin cases where an accused is undefended and 'where the trial judge is satisfied 
that, because of the seriousness and complexity of the case, the accused cannot receive a fair 
trial without counsel, there is an entrenched right to funded counsel under .the Charter'. 36 
2.3. Case law in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights makes special provision for the 
right to be provided with legal representation. The case law which has emanated from the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human· Rights, 
concerning the notion of a 'fair trial' and the principle of 'equality of arms', also has an 
33 S7: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice'. 
34 Sll(d): 'Any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal'. 
35 (1985) 48 CR (3d) 166 (Ont Div Ct) at 172-4. 
36 The court is cautious to add that it has not created a new right, but that it is the same right enjoyed 
by an accused at common law; Ibid at 174. But see Whitley,SJ Criminal Justice and the Constitution at 215, 
where the author is of the opinion that the importance of legal representation is recognised in Canadian law, 
but that a lack of representation does not vitiate the trial proceedings. 
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important contribution to make to the discussion in this section. 
2.3.1. Principle of 'equality of arms' 
Fawcett states that the principle of 'equality of arms' is an off-shoot from the audi alteram 
panem rule, and implies that each party to the proceedings must have an equal opportunity 
to present his or her case, both on facts and in law, and to comment on the other party's 
case. 37 In other words, neither party should enjoy an improper advantage during the 
litigation proceedings. 38 In the Delcourt case (1970) the meaning of this principle was 
explained as follows: 
a trial would not be fair if it took place in such conditions as to put the accused 
unfairly at a disadvantage. 39 
Van Dijk and Van Hoof are of the opinion that the principle of 'equality of arms', as used 
in the civil case of Bricmont (1987) 'implies in particular that no element of the examinatipn 
of the case may be settled when one party is present or represented, but the other is not' .40 
They argue that this principle is of even greater importance in criminal proceedings which, 
by the nature of the proceedings, automatically places the parties on an unequal footing.41 
37 Fawcett,JES (1987) The application of the European Convention 011 Huma11 Rights at 154. 
38 Merrills,JG (1988) The developmelll of i11temational law by the Europea11 Court of Human Rights 
at 166. 
39 As quoted by Merrills, ibid at 171. 
40 Van Dijk,P & Van Hoof,GJH Theory and Practice of the Europea11 Co11vention 011 Huma11 Rights 
at 319. 
41 Ibid at 319. 
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It could therefore be argued that a failure by the State to secure legal assistance for indigent 
accused contravenes the principle of 'equality of arms' and that such a contravention would 
render the trial unfair. 
The principle of 'equality of arms', although concerned with procedural inequalities,42 has 
also played an important role in determining substantive inequalities, which Merrills refers 
to as 'real or imagined inequality' .43 It is in other words not sufficient that an accused had 
been afforded procedural equality in terms of the minimum guarantees under paragraph 3. 
These guarantees are constituent elements of the larger concept of a 'fair trial' 44 and 
equality must be established in terms of this broader notion. 
2.3.2. Right of 'access to court' 
The other interpretative development from which a right to be provided with legal aid can 
possibly be argued, is the right of 'access to court'. In the Golder case (1975) the Court, 
in looking at the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole and, in particular to the 
reference in the Preamble to the rule of law (and also to the references to the same concept 
in the Statute of the Council of Europe), interpreted article 6(1) as granting a 'right to 
42 See Fe/dl.,rugge case (1987), referred to in Merrills,JG op cit note 38 at 172-3. 
43 Merrills,JG op cit note 38 at 169; see also theBonisch case (1985) referred to in Merrills al 170. 
44 As proclaimed in article 6(1); Merrills,JG op cit note 38 at 170. 
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a judicial procedure'. 45 
In order to comply with the principle of 'equality of arms' it is possible to argue that the 
right of an indigent accused to be provided with legal representation flows from the right of 
'access to court'. Such a line of reasoning was followed by the European Court in the Airey 
case (1979), which indicated that the burden of legal costs in a lawsuit could be raised as 
evidence of an inequality of arms.46 The Court held that the right of 'access to court' may 
oblige contracting States to facilitate access to the courts, by reducing legal costs, simplifying 
the proceedings or by providing free legal aid, 
when such assistance proves indispensable for an effective access to court either 
because legal representation is rendered compulsory, as is done by the domestic law 
of certain Contracting States for various types of litigation, or by reason of the 
complexity of the procedure or of the case.47 
The above discussion on the case law emanating from the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights and Commission on Human Rights reveals the potential for extending the 
right of an indigent accused to be provided with legal representation, when such concepts as 
the 'object' and 'purpose' of a document (as a whole) are taken into consideration. 
45 Van Dijk,P & Van Hoof,GJH op cit note 40 at 314. The Court said that this right is a necessary 
implication of the right stated in article 6, arguing that it is inconceivable that the Convention 'should describe 
in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not first protectthat which 
alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court'; Merrills.JG op cit 
note 38 at 76. 
46 Van Dijk,P & Van Hoof,GJH op cit note 40 at 31,6-7; 322. 
47 As quoted in Fawcett,JES op cit note 37 at 157. 
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3. Purposive interpretation of the Government Charter 
Turning now to the South African proposals under discussion, both the principles of 'equality 
of all before the law' and a 'fair trial' are arguably enshrined in the Government Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the Law Commission Report of 1991. 
3.1. Equality before the law 
Clause 6 of the Government Charter48 guarantees the equality of all persons before the law 
and includes equal protection to all persons by the law. In subsection (2) the Charter 
precludes prejudice in terms of various qualifications, including 'social class', which one can 
read to mean 'economic class'. 
It could thus be argued that if a particular accused because of financial difficulties is forced 
to defend him or herself this would be in breach of clause 6(1) and (2), as such accused can 
· not be said to have received the same equal protection as an accused who can afford the skill 
and knowledge of a legal practitioner. The situation can be argued to amount to a prejudice 
being perpetrated on the basis of economic class. It is appropriate to quote the wisdom 
expressed in Griffin v lllinois:49 
[i]n criminal trials a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on 
account of religion, race or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears 
no relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse 
48 Article 3 of the South African Law Commission interim Report, 1991. 
49 351 US 12 (1956) at 19; quoted by Steytler in 'Equality before the law: being practical about 
principle' SAJHR (1992) vol 8(1) at 114. 
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to deprive a defendant of a fair trial ... There can be no equal justice where the kind 
of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has'. 
A further argument in support of the provision of legal assistance to indigent accused was 
proffered by Didcott J in S v Khanyile and Another. 50 The argument is that an accused who 
can afford legal representation, but who is denied this right by the court, is in a similar 
predicament to an accused who desires such assistance, but can not afford it. There is no 
distinction in principle between the two situations, 'a defence sorely handicapped being the 
result common to both' .51 In the former instance, however, the right is regarded as 
fundamental to a fair trial to the extent that its denial is deemed to be an irregularity which 
per se vitiates the trial proceedings. It must surely follow that equality before the law 
demands that an indigent accused's trial be judged according to the same principles. 
3.2. Fair trial 
Article 7(a) of the Law Commission's interim report entrenches an accused's right to 'a fair 
and public trial before a court of law'. Although the Government Charter does not 
specifically enshrine a right to a fair trial (but only to a public trial), clause 26 falls under 
the heading of Fair Trial. 
It is thus necessary to establish what importance can be attributed to headings in a legislative 
document. There appear to be two views. The first is the traditional literal approach which 
50 1988 (3) SA 795 (N) at 810C-D;H·. See also S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 at 175A-C. 
51 S v Davids;S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 at 175A. 
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was applied in Chotabhai v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Registrar of 
Asiatics. 52 De Villiers CJ held that 'the headings of different portions of a Statute may be 
referred to for the purpose of determining the sense of any doubtful expression in a section , 
ranged under any particular heading'. 
According to this interpretation, an accused will only be said to have a right to a fair trial 
if it can be argued that the wording in clause 26 is either unclear or ambiguous. 
It is submitted that the better view is that expounded by Innes CJ in Turffontein Estates Ltd 
v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg. 53 In casu the learned judge held that a court is 
'fully entitled to refer to [a heading] for elucidation of any clause to which it relates. It is 
impossible to lay-down any general rule as to the weight which should be attached to such 
headings. The object in each case is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, and the 
heading is an element in the process'. This latter case follows a purposive approach, 
whereby the purpose and intention of the document as a whole can be taken into 
consideration to establish the importance of a particular heading. 
In addition to the heading of clause 26, it is necessary to consider the clause as a whole in 
order to establish the purpose and intention of the provision. The clause expressly defines 
other minimum rights to which an accused is entitled and which also pertain to the notion of 
a fair trial. The list of rights can not be regarded as exhaustive. It is submitted that a right 
52 1911 AD 13 at 24; quoted in Devenish,GE/nterpretatio11 of Statutes at 107. 
53 1917 AD 419 at 431; quoted in Devenish op cit note 52 at 107. 
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to a fair trial can be interpreted under clause 26 when both the overall context and the 
heading are taken into consideration. 
Additional arguments in favour of interpreting a right to a fair trial in the Government 
Charter include the recognition of this right as a fundamental one in South African law.54 
The importance of being legally represented in criminal proceedings in an adversarial justice 
system has repeatedly been stressed in the case law55 and has similarly been emphasised in 
the Hoexter Commission's Report on the Structure and Functioning of the Couns: 56 
[a]ny state that prides itself on a democratic way of life should not regard legal 
representation of parties before its courts as a pure luxury or a fortuitous benefaction 
of the Government, but as an essential service ... Modern administration of justice 
is intrinsically complex, and the best guarantee of proper adjudication of a case lies 
in proper legal representation of the parties concerned'. 
In conclusion, it can thus be argued, that the entrenchment of the principle of 'equality of 
all before the law' and the right to a fair trial in the Government Charter and the Law 
Commission's Report of 1991, together with the guidance afforded by the American and 
Canadian jurisprudence on this matter, offers a progressive bench ample scope for 
interpreting the existence of the right to be provided with legal representation. 
54 S v Tyebela 1989 (2) SA 22 (A) at 29G-H; S v Alexander and Others 1965 (2) SA 796 (A) at 
809C-D. 
55 S v Seheri en Andere 1964 (1) SA 29 (A) at 33H; S v Radebe; S v Mbonani 1988 (1) SA 191 (T) 
at 196D-I; S v Davids; S v Dladla 1989 (4) SA 172 (N) at 1820-F. 
56 Fifth and Final Report, vol I part II para 6.4.1. 
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The question to be determined now, is whether reliance on these. two provisions overrides 
the explicit wording of the provision dealing with legal representation. When such a conflict 
between two provisions arises, the method of resolution depends on the presence or absence 
of a circumscription clause. 
3.3. Circumscription clause 
The function of a bill of rights can be said to be the 'mediation between collective social 
interests and individual dignity and freedom' .57 It is thus inevitable that competing claims 
will arise in terms of this mediation. The concept of a general circumscription clause has 
been developed in various bills of rights to act as a measure for courts to settle competing 
provisions in such a document. 
The function of a general circumscription clause in a bill of rights is, firstly, to guarantee 
the rights and freedoms enshrined in the document, and, secondly, to 'outline explicitly the 
exclusive justificatory criteria against which limitations on those rights and freedoms must 
be measured' .58 A typical justificatory criterion is an infringement which 'can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'. 59 
Once a violation of a guarantee. has been established, the question follows whether the 
57 Corder et al (1992) A Charter for Social Justice: a Contribution to the South African Bill of Rights 
debate at 16. 
58 Corder et al op cit note 57 at 23. 
59 Section l .of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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violation can be justified in terms of the standard established in the circumscription clause. 
Corder et al suggest that this second enquiry concerns the principle of proportionality. This 
principle is concerned with balancing the community's interests with those of the individuals, 
whose rights and freedoms are being infringed. 60 The party wishing to justify the 
infringement of the entrenched guarantee, bears the onus of proof. 
Steytler says that there are three components to the enquiry of proportionality:61 Firstly, 
the means employed to effect the objective must not be based on irrational of unfair 
considerations. Secondly, the guarantees which are being infringed, must be impaired as 
little as possible, by the chosen means. Thirdly, proportionality must be established between 
the effects of the means used, and the objective of the means. 'The more invasive the 
limitation on the right, the more important the objective of the measure should be' .62 
The Government Charter contains a general circumscription clause in clause 1 (2)(a). The 
limitations considered on the fundamental rights and freedoms are explained in clauses 35 
and 36. Clause 35 permits a limitation of a right, which is 'reasonably necessary' (a) to 
ensure state security and public safety; (b) to uphold the rights and freedoms of others; (c) 
to prevent or combat violence or crime; and (d) to prevent and deal with natural disasters. 
Clause 36 permits limitations on fundamental rights during the existence of a state of 
emergency. 
60 Steytler,NC in 'Criminal Procedure, a Bill of Rights and a General Circumscription Clause' 
Unpublished Paper (January 1993) which was delivered at the Law Teachers' Conference in Stellenbosch, 
at 7. 
61 Steytler op cit note 60 at 7. 
62 Steytler op cit note 60 at 8. 
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The criterion of 'reasonably necessary' is fairly vague, as no standard is provided according 
to which reasonable necessity is measured. It is submitted that the criterion should be 
interpreted in the light of the overall purpose and intention of the Charter as stated in clause 
1(1), which is to entrench the fundamental rights and freedoms against State and other 
interference. 
The South African Law Commission in its interim Report provides a general circumscription 
clause under article 34(l)(a). However, many of the provisions pertaining to criminal 
procedure are excluded from the general circumscription clause, and either contain specific 
circumscriptions, or non at all. 
Steytler suggests that several problems may flow from the above situation:63 (i) difficulties 
may arise in resolving competing provisions; (ii) artificial hierarchies are introduced between 
rights which are subject to the general circumscription clause, and those rights which are not; 
and (ii) it is possible that courts will be forced to create ad hoc circumscriptions to determine 
two competing rights. 
The question of the right to be provided with legal representation presents a good example 
of the dilemma that might arise in terms of the Law Commission's provisions. Neither 
article 7(a) (which guarantees an accused a right to a fair trial), nor article 3(a) (which 
guarantees equality of all persons before the law) is subject to the general circumscription 
clause, or contains a specific circumscription. An indigent accused can argue that in order 
to comply with these two provision he (or she) is entitled to be provided with legal 
63 Steytler op cit note 60 at 2. 
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representation. However, article 7(e) (which pertains to legal representation) only places a 
duty on a presiding officer to inform an accused of his or her right to legal representation. 
This article is also not subject to any circumscription. 
The question thus arises how the court should resolve the conflict between an accused's right 
to equality before the law, and the State's right only to inform such accused of his or her 
right to legal representation. Steytler is of the opinion that '[i]t is impossible to resolve the 
conflict unless the Court reads an implied circumscription clause in each of the provisions 
... and then tries -to rank these two rights'. 64 
• 
It is submitted that a general circumscription clause offers the best method of resolving 
conflicting provisions in a bill of rights. The question posed earlier, of whether the two 
provisions of equality before the law and the right to a fair trial override the express wording 
in the provision relating to legal representation, would have to be determined according to 
the guidelines offered by the circumscription clause. 
64 Steytler op cit note 60 at 3. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERPRETING AN EXPANSIVE RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
This chapter will investigate the ambit of the right to legal representation, as entrenched in 
the ANC draft Bill of Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ANC Bill), the Charter for Social 
Justice1 and the South African Law Commission Report on Group and Human Rights of 
1989, when subjected to either a restrictive or a purposive interpretation. 2 
All the above-mentioned documents enshrine, in addition to the traditional right to legal 
representation, the right of an indigent accused to be provided with free legal representation. 
The ANC Bill has followed the trend of most international instruments by guaranteeing the 
right of an accused person to be provided with legal representation 'when the interests of 
justice so require'. 3 Article 12(3) of the Charter for Social Justice uses the same 
qualification as the ANC Bill, but includes 'detained persons' in the definition. This is 
intended to broaden the scope of the right to include 'accused persons not yet in court, as 
well as people falling outside the criminal justice process, such as those in mental 
institutions' .4 The South African Law Commission Report (1989) differs from the other 
1 A document drawn up by a nu_mber of Western Cape academics as a contribution to the South African 
Bill of Rights debate; Corder et al (1992) A Charter for Social Justice: a Contribution to the South African Bill 
of Rights debate. 
2 As all three documents are very similar in their approach and content, only the ANC document will 
.be referred to, unless a particular point is raised in one of the other documents. 
3 Article 2(21). 
4 Corder H et al op cit note 1 at 42. 
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documents under discussion in that it only extends this right to 'serious cases' .5 
An indigent accused's right to be provided with free legal assistance does not automatically 
apply in all cases. The right is qualified in each of the above documents by the criterion of 
'when the interests of justice so require' (and by the criterion of 'serious cases', in the South 
African Law Commission document, 1989). Such a qualification is also found in most 
international documents. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,6 the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1 and 
the Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any form of detention or 
imprisonment8 all make provision for legal aid for indigent persons where the interests of 
justice so require: 9 . 
The reason for limiting the right to be provided with legal representation by this criterion is 
a question of economics. It would be unreasonable to expect the State to fund legal aid for 
petty cases, such as traffic fines. 
5 Article 25(d). 
6 Article 14(3)(d). 
7 Article 6(3)(c). 
8 Principle 17. 
9 Two documents appear to guarantee legal assistance without any qualifications imposed on this right: 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art 40(2)(b)(ii)) requires the State to ensure that every child facing 
a criminal charge is provided with 'legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of 
his or her defence'. The American Convention on Human Rights provides that an accused has an 'inalienable 
right to be assisted by council provided by the state' where an accused fails to defend him or herself, or to 
engage legal assistance of personal choice (art 8(2)(e)). 
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The qualification 'when the interests of justice so require' is an open-ended qualification. 
The intention of using this qualification is that it allows the courts to develop criteria in terms 
of which the entitlement is expanded over time. 10 
The discussion in chapter three illustrated the effect that a particular method of interpretation 
can have on the operation of a bill of rights. Although the entitlement to be provided with 
legal representation, as entrenched in the ANC Bill, appears to meet the plea made by 
Didcott J in S v Khanyile, 11 the ambit of a fundamental right or freedom can still be 
severely curtailed by the application of a restrictive interpretation. The two Bophuthatswana 
cases of S v Chabalala12 and Government of the Republic of Bophuthatswana and Others 
v Segale, 13 and the minority judgment in the Canadian case of Morgentaler, Smoling and 
Scott v The Queen14 (discussed in chapter three), although concerned with entitlements other 
than the right to legal representation, serve as clear examples of how entrenched fundamental 
rights and freedoms can be eroded by applying a restrictive interpretation to a bill of rights. 
On the other hand, a purposive interpretation has the possibility of substantially broadening 
the scope of an entitlement, as evidenced in the discussion on the jurisprudence emanating 
from the American, Canadian and European Court of Human Rights and Commission on 
Human Rights case law. 
10 Corder H et al. op cit note 1 at 42. · 
11 1988 (3) ~A (N) 795. 
12 1986 (3) SA 623 (BA). 
13 1990 (1) SA 434 (BA). 
14 (1988) 37 CCC (3d) 449. 
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1. Restrictive interpretation 
The criterion of 'the severity of the charge' will be argued to form the major guideline for 
the courts when determining the application of the provision of legal representation, both in 
terms of a restrictive and a purposive interpretation. 
The South African Law Commission (1989) specifically uses the qualification of 'serious 
cases' for the application of the entitlement to be provided with legal representation. If the 
current restrictive attitude of the courts, of being loathe to impose duties on the State (as 
evidenced in the case of S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana, 15), is followed, then it will 
lead to a very limited interpretation of what constitutes a serious case. Furthermore, if the 
courts are compelled to impose such a duty, because of a legislative entitlement to that effect; 
they will do so in as limited a fashion as possible. By limiting the criterion to that of 
'seriousness', ad~itional criteria, such as complexity or public interest, do not arise for 
consideration. 
'Serious cases' can be interpreted to equate capital cases or it can be limited to comply with 
the 'special circumstances' test established in Betts v Brady, 16 which would still restrict the 
application of this entitlement fairly severely. Such an interpretation of the provision is only 
possible if the provision is read restrictively and in isolation, without any reference to the 
overall purpose and intention of the document. 
15 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
16 316 us 455 (1941) 476. 
\ 
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The qualification, of 'when the interests of justice so require', imposed by the ANC Bill on 
the entitlement to be provided with legal representation, can similarly, if interpreted 
restrictively and without reference to the entrenched rights of all accused to a fair trial and 
to equality before the law, be so narrowly construed by a conservative bench as to merely 
elevate the current pro deo practice in the Supreme Court to a right. 
2. Purposive interpretation 
Two important principles, essential to a fair trial in an adversarial criminal justice system, 
can be discerned from the American, Canadian and European jurisprudence (discussed in 
chapter four), namely, 'equality of all accused' and 'equality of contestants'. The 
development of these two principles assisted the courts to establish the existen~e of a right 
to legal representation. 
The ANC Bill already entrenches an entitlement to legal representation in article 2(21). 
However, due to economic considerations, it is impossible to provide all indigent accused 
with such legal assistance. It is therefore necessary to establish criteria which would best 
comply with the above two principles. 
As with the discussion on the restrictive interpretation, the main criterion to be considered 
is that of the seriousness of the charge. However, when this criterion is viewed in terms of 
the two principles of 'fairness' and 'equality', it is possible to attribute a much broader 
content to the criterion. 
68 
iJ 
The American approach, in terms of Argersinger v Hamlin17 , has been to determine the 
criterion of imprisonment as qualifying for the entitlement to be provided with legal 
representation. Therefore, seriousness can be equated with imprisonment. It is submitted 
that the criterion of imprisonment is a good measure to use as the applicability of the 
entitlement is easily establish from the outset of the trial. 
In S v Khanyile18 Didcott J suggested that the following criteria be used to establish when 
the entitlement to· be provided with legal representation arises: (i) the severity of the charge 
and possible consequences if a conviction should follow - here the learned judge includes 
non-custodial sentences as qualifying criteria; (ii) the complexity of the case; and (iii) the 
ability of the accused to defend him or herself. 19 The learned judge furthermore indicates 
that a fairly extensive enquiry of all three aspects, as well as related information should be 
undertaken to properly assess the circumstances. In weighing up this information, if a court 
comes to the conclusion that the lack of legal representation would result in a trial which is 
palpably and grossly unfair, such an accused would qualify for pro deo legal assistance. 20 
Steytler criticises the inclusion of non-custodial sentences when determining the gravity of 
a charge, as he says that it 'makes this criterion difficult to apply in practice and casts the 
17 407 us 25 (1972). 
18 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
19 Ibid at 815D-F. The European Court of Human Rights evolved an additional criterion to those 
suggested by DidcottJ, ofpub:ic importance; Fawcett,JES (1987) The application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights at 192. 
20 Ibid at 8151-816B. 
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net of possible beneficiaries too wide'21 • Particularly in South Africa, where the legal 
system is already overburdened, it is important to establish the qualifying criteria very 
clearly, so as to ensure the appointment of representatives in those cases most needed. 
Furthermore, regarding the other two criteria laid down by Didcott J, Steytler is of the 
opinion that they are both difficult to assess at the outset of the trial, as the true complexity 
of the case may only become apparent once evidence is led. However, this impracticality 
may be overcome by the court asking the prosecution, at arraignment, to give an outline of 
the evidence of the case. 22 
Steytler suggests that the criteria establishep by Didcott J should, where appropriate, be 
considered separately, as one of the criteria may be so severe as to warrant the immediate 
appointment of legal representation without further regard being had to the other two criteria. 
Steytler gives the following example: '[w]here [an] accused's mental capacity to stand trial 
is in doubt and he has been referred for mental observation, that fact alone will justify the 
appointment of legal representation. '23 
In terms of such an approach it is possible to extend the ambit of the qualification used in 
the South Law Commission Report (1989) beyond that envisaged earlier in this discussion. 
It can be argued that it is always a 'serious case' when a person is faced with the loss of his 
or her life or liberty. 
21 Steytler,NC (1988) The Undefended Accused at 238. 
22 Ibid at 239. 
23 Ibid at 239-40. 
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It is submitted that the best criterion to follow when determining the ambit of the entitlement 
to be provided with legal representation, is that of imprisonment, as it offers the clearest 




The Appellate Division decision in S v Rudman and Another; S v Mthwana1 has determined 
that the current position regarding the right to legal representation, only imposes a duty on 
a presiding officer to inform an accused of his or her right to legal representation, as well 
as his or her entitlement to apply to the Legal Aid Board for legal assistance. 
It was suggested that this situation may change if a bill of rights is included in a new 
Constitution for South Africa. Two approaches to the right to legal representation can be 
discerned from proposed bills of rights: The first approach (which is that of the Government 
Charter on Fundamental Human Rights and the South African Law Commission interim 
Report, 1991) is based mainly on the above position in the Rudman case. The second 
approach (which is that of the ANC draft Bill of Rights, the Charter for Social Justice and 
the South African Law Commission Report, 1989) makes provision for an indigent accused 
person to be provided with legal representation 'when the interests of justice so require'. 
The latter provision can be said to be more in line with international trends in this regard. 
It has been argued in this paper that should either of the two proposed provisions on legal 
representation be adopted in a South African Bill of Rights, it is possible, by means of a 
purposive 'interpretative approach, to determine the existence of a right to be provided with 
legal representation. 
1 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
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Furthermore, it is submitted that the purpose of the entrenchment of the right to be provided 
with free legal representation in the ANC Bill of Rights is an attempt to redress the current 
position where more than 80% of all accused in criminal cases are unrepresented, and over 
100 000 accused are yearly sent to prison witqout any form of legal representation. 2 It is 
·. 
also an attempt to ensure equality and fairness to all citizens of South Africa, irrespective, 
in particular, of their economic status. As Steytler says, 
[i]n the administration of criminal justice the principle of equality implies, inter alia, 
-
that access to rights should not be dependent upon the race, sex or class of an accused 
person. Rights should be accessible to all accused - black and white, male and 
female, rich and poor, literate and illiterate, defended and undefended. 3 
The specific clauses ensuring equality of all persons before the law and the protection of 
individuals against unfair discrimination, entrenched in all the proposed bills of rights, 
strengthen the proposition that the overall intention of the proposed Bills of Rights is to 
recognise the inherent inequalities of the status quo and to take positive steps to establish 
greater equality for all South Africans. 
2 Statistics for the year 1990 estimated that 70% of accused appearing in regional magistrate's courts, 
and 90% of accused appearing in district magistrates' courts, were unrepresented; McQuoid-Mason,DJ 'Rudma11 
and the Right to Counsel: is it feasible to implement Khanyile?' SA/HR (1992) vol 8(1) at 99-100. Recent 
statistics from Hansard indicate that a total of 684 246 accused persons appeared in the lower courts without· 
legal representation, and more than 100 000 of these accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment 
during the year 1992; Davis, DM 'The high price of legal advice' The Weekly Mail (April 30 to May 6, 1993) 
at 15. 
3 Steytler,NC 'Eq~lity before the law and the right to legal representation' SACJ (1989)2 at 68. 
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